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Abstract 
 
Sensor nodes are low power, tiny, and computationally restricted 
microelectromechanical devices that usually run on battery.  They are capable of 
communicating over short distances and of sensing information for specific purposes. In 
sensor networks, large amount of sensor nodes are deployed over a wide region. For secure 
communication among sensor nodes, secure links must be established via key agreement. 
Due to resource constraints, achieving such key agreement in wireless sensor networks is 
non-trivial. Many key establishment schemes, like Diffie-Hellman and public-key 
cryptography based protocols, proposed for general networks are not so suitable for sensor 
networks due to resource constraints. Since one cannot generally assume a trusted 
infrastructure, keys and/or keying materials must be distributed to sensor nodes before 
deployment of them. Such key distribution schemes are called key predistribution schemes. 
After deployment, sensor nodes use predistributed keys and/or keying materials to establish 
secure links using various techniques. 
 
In this thesis, we propose a probabilistic key predistribution scheme, in which we 
assume that certain deployment knowledge is available prior to deployment of sensor 
nodes. We use a two-tier approach in which there are two types of nodes: regular nodes and 
agent nodes. Agent nodes, which constitute a small percentage of all nodes, are more 
 v 
capable than regular nodes. Most of the regular nodes can establish shared keys among 
themselves without the help of agent nodes, whereas some other regular nodes make use of 
agent nodes as intermediaries for key establishment. We give a comparative analysis of our 
scheme through simulations and show that our scheme provides good connectivity for the 
sensor network. Moreover, our scheme exhibits substantially strong node-capture resiliency 
against small-scale attacks, while the resiliency of the network degrades gracefully as the 
number of captured nodes increases. In addition, the proposed scheme is scalable such that 
increasing the number of nodes in the network does not degrade the performance and does 
not increase the complexity. Another good characteristic of our scheme is that it is resistant 
against node fabrication and partially resistant against wormhole attacks.   
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DUYARGA AĞLARI İÇİN İKİ SEVİYELİ, KONUM BİLGİSİ KULLANAN VE 
YÜKSEK DAYANIKLILIĞA SAHİP ÖN YÜKLEMELİ ANAHTAR DAĞITIM 
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ÖZET 
 
Duyarga düğümleri kısa mesafelerde iletişim kurma yetisine sahip, belirli amaçlara 
yönelik bilgi toplayabilen elektromekanik cihazlardır. Duyarga düğümleri genellikle küçük, 
düşük enerji tüketen, pil gücü zayıf ve kısıtlı hesaplama yapmaya uygun bir yapıya 
sahiptirler. Bir duyarga ağında, geniş bir alana dağılmış çok miktarda duyarga cihazı vardır. 
Herhangi iki duyarga düğümü arasında güvenli bir iletişim için, güvenli ve şifrelenmiş bir 
hat oluşturmak gerekir. Güvenli bir hat oluşturmak için gerekli olan ortak anahtar türetmek 
işi, duyarga düğümlerinin kısıtlı kaynaklara sahip olmaları yüzünden basit bir şekilde 
yapılamaz. Genel anlamda ağlar için önerilen açık anahtarlı şifreleme yöntemi, kısıtlı 
kaynakları sebebiyle duyarga ağları için uygun değildir. Ayrıca, duyarga ağları güvenilir 
bir altyapıya sahip olmadıkları için, anahtarların ve diğer güvenlik bilgilerinin duyarga 
düğümlerine konuşlandırma öncesi yüklenmesi gereklidir. Bu tip şemalara ön-yüklemeli 
anahtar dağıtım şemaları denir. Konuşlandırma sonrası duyarga düğümleri, önceden 
yüklenmiş olan anahtarları ve diğer güvenlik bilgilerini değişik metotlarda kullanarak 
güvenli hat oluştururlar.   
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Bu tezde, rastlantısal ön yüklemeli bir anahtar dağıtım mekanizması önerilmektedir. 
Önerilen yöntemde, duyarga cihazlarının konuşlandırma sonrası konumlarına ait bazı 
bilgilere kısmen sahip olunabileceği kabul edilmektedir. Kullanılan şemada, duyarga 
düğümleri arasında iki sıralı bir yapı mevcuttur. Duyarga ağını iki tip düğüm oluşturur: 
sıradan ve aracı düğümler. Aracı duyarga düğümleri duyarga ağının az bir kısmını oluşturur 
ve sıradan duyarga düğümlerine göre daha gelişmiş özelliklere sahiptir. Önerilen yöntemin 
performans analizi simülasyonlar ile yapılmıştır ve analiz sonuçları göstermektedir ki, 
önerilen anahtar dağıtım yöntemi yüksek bağlanabilirlik özelliğine sahiptir. Ayrıca, 
önerilen anahtar dağıtım yöntemi ufak çaplı saldırılara karşı güçlü dayanıklılığa sahiptir. 
Tezde önerilen yöntemin bir başka özelliği de kolay bir şekilde ölçeklenebilir olmasıdır. 
Bununla birlikte, önerilen yöntem duyarga düğümü kopyalanması ve wormhole 
saldırılarına karşı dayanıklıdır. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Sensor nodes are small and battery powered devices with limited computational 
power, memory capacity and radio range. They are low-cost devices and large number of 
sensor nodes can be deployed over a target area to form a sensor network. Sensor networks 
can be utilized for environment monitoring, investigation of hazardous environments, 
health services or military services as detailed in [3]. 
  
Confidentiality, privacy and authenticity of communication among the sensor nodes 
should be provided, whether communication is for transfer of sensed data or some other 
operational messages, when nodes are deployed in an environment where there are 
adversaries. In order to fulfill these security requirements, cryptographic techniques are 
employed. Although there has been some recent studies to use public key cryptography 
(PKC) in sensor networks [4, 5, 6], it is still not so practical to use PKC in all sensor nodes. 
Thus, symmetric cryptography is used to provide security in sensor networks. In order to 
use symmetric key cryptography, communicating sensor nodes must share the same 
cryptographic key. The problem of distribution of keys to large number of sensor nodes is 
an active research area. Key predistribution schemes [1, 7-12], where they keys are stored 
in sensor nodes before the deployment, are proven to be practical and efficient solutions. 
 
A naïve way of key predistribution is to generate a master key and install this master 
key to all nodes before the deployment. After deployment, all the sensor nodes can encrypt, 
decrypt and authenticate their communication with this master key. However, in this 
scheme, when a node is captured, the master key is also captured and all secure links in the 
sensor network are compromised.  
 
One possible way to protect keys inside a sensor node is to tamper-proof the device. 
However, this approach increases the cost of sensor nodes [49]. Furthermore, tamper-
proofing may not be always safe as discussed in [13]. In this thesis, we assume that sensor 
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devices are not tamper-resistant, so when a node is captured, all the cryptographic 
information in the node can be seized by the attacker.  
 
Another way of key predistribution is to assign unique link keys for each node. In this 
method, compromise of one node leads to compromise of only that node’s links. However, 
this method is not scalable since the total number keys to be predistributed per node should 
be as much as the number of nodes in the network in order to guarantee that after 
deployment each neighboring node pair has a common key. As the size of the network 
grows, it would be hard to realize this scheme since sensor nodes have only limited amount 
of memory.  
 
In order to overcome this scalability problem and effectively use the node’s memory, 
Eschenauer and Gligor proposed a probabilistic key predistribution scheme [1]. In this 
scheme, before sensor deployment, a key server creates a key ring for each node, by 
picking a limited number of random keys from a large key pool. Then the key server loads 
the key ring to memory of each node. After deployment, sensor nodes let their neighbors 
know which keys they have. If two neighboring nodes share one or more keys, then they 
can establish a secure link by using the shared key. After this shared key discovery with 
direct neighbors, neighboring node pairs that do not share keys can establish secure links in 
multiple hops. If the local connectivity (in terms of secure links) is above a certain 
threshold, then random graph theory [14] states that overall sensor network will be 
cryptographically connected with high probability. 
 
Du et al. [9] utilized Blom’s key management scheme [2] in a key predistribution 
scheme for sensor networks. Du et al.’s scheme shows a threshold property; until λ nodes 
are captured, the network is perfectly secure, but if λ+1 or more nodes are captured all 
secure links are compromised.  
 
Some recent papers on random key predistribution [8, 11, 15, 16, 17] utilized 
expected location information of sensor nodes in their sensor node deployment models. In 
all these location-aware approaches, it is assumed that nodes are prepared in small groups 
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and deployed as bundles, e.g. groups of nodes can be dropped from a plane, similar to 
parachuting troops or dropping cargo. The nodes in the same group have a large chance of 
being in the radio communication range of each other. Similarly, the node groups that are 
dropped next to each other also have a chance to be close to each other on the ground. 
Using this deployment location knowledge, key pools and key rings are arranged and 
analysis show that performance of key predistribution schemes is improved substantially. 
In location aware schemes, the node deployment model is one of the most important design 
criteria that directly affect the performance of the scheme. There is still room to further 
improve the performance, in terms of connectivity, resiliency and memory usage, of key 
distribution schemes with better deployment models and key distribution methods.  
  
1.1 Contribution of the Thesis 
 
We propose a scalable, two-tier approach for key predistribution problem in sensor 
networks, where there are two types of sensor nodes with different capabilities: regular 
nodes and agent nodes. Keys are predistributed according to nodes’ capabilities, such that 
more keys and keying material are stored in agent nodes that constitute a small part of the 
network and are more capable than regular nodes. For example, in a military setting, many 
simple sensor nodes may be deployed in a field of operation along with a small set of more 
powerful, more secure nodes, perhaps in attended vehicles.  
 
In our scheme, we make use of deployment knowledge. Our node deployment method 
is based on the observation that if a group of sensor nodes is deployed at a deployment 
point, they will likely reside in close proximity with each other. Using such deployment 
knowledge, we can predict probable set of neighbors of a node. We divide the deployment 
area into zones and create separate key spaces for each zone. Bundles of sensor nodes are 
prepared and keys and/or keying material from corresponding key spaces are distributed to 
nodes. Then, bundles of nodes are deployed at different zones. By employing deployment 
knowledge in our key predistribution scheme, we achieve efficient memory usage and high 
connectivity.  
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The proposed key predistribution scheme is highly scalable, such that our scheme 
works well in networks of all sizes. Since we use a zone-based approach and key spaces for 
each zone are separate, addition of new zones does not increase the memory and 
communication costs of other nodes. Agent nodes are given keys from their zones’ key 
space(s) and they share keys with other agent nodes from neighboring zones. On the other 
hand, regular nodes are given keys such that they can establish secure links only with 
same-zone neighbors without intervention of agent nodes. Another benefit of this approach 
is that our scheme provides partial resistance against wormhole attacks.  
 
Our key predistribution scheme has node-to-node authentication property. In our 
scheme, cryptographic keys and IDs of nodes that the keys are stored are linked, so that 
nodes can verify the identity of each other. Authentication property prevents attacks like 
node fabrication and malicious node insertion, which will be described in detail in the 
following sections.  
 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: in Section 2, we provide background 
information on sensor networks and sensor devices, and we briefly describe some of the 
previous work done on key predistribution for sensor networks. In Section 3, we describe 
our two-tier location-aware key predistribution scheme. In Section 4, we provide a 
comparative analysis of our scheme. We give evaluation of our scheme in terms of 
connectivity, resiliency and communication cost. In addition, we provide comparisons of 
our scheme with existing key predistribution schemes. Finally, we provide some 
concluding remarks in Section 5. 
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2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
 
 
We can define a sensor node as a low power, tiny and computationally restricted 
microelectromechanical device that usually runs on battery and is capable of 
communicating over short distances and sensing information for specific purposes. A 
sensor node typically contains a power unit, a sensing unit, a processing unit, a storage unit, 
and a wireless transmitter / receiver. A wireless sensor network (WSN) is composed of 
large number of sensor nodes with limited power, computation, storage and communication 
capabilities [22]. Commercially available sensors, such as the Berkeley MICA2 mote [38] 
and µAMPS wireless sensor node [39], are characterized by their limited processing 
capability, tiny memory, and small size.  
 
SmartDust [25] and WINS [37] are some of practical sensor network projects. An 
important feature of a sensor network is its cooperative effort [23]. Sensor network 
protocols and algorithms must possess self-organizing capabilities and exhibit cooperative 
higher-level behavior. Sensor devices have on-board processors, which can carry out 
simple computations. Instead of sending raw sensed data, sensor devices can do some local 
computation and partially process raw data.   
 
Sensor nodes are deployed near the phenomenon or event that we need data about 
[21]. The environments that nodes are deployed can be controlled or uncontrolled places. 
Controlled environments are usually places with limited size, such as home, office, 
warehouse, factory, etc. Uncontrolled environments are usually dangerous and/or vast 
places, such as battleground, disaster area, toxic regions, forests, etc. Deployment of nodes 
can be achieved by hand in controlled areas but as the number of nodes grows, it becomes 
highly impractical. If the target environment is an uncontrolled one, then nodes have to be 
deployed by scattering, using either aerial or ground vehicles.  
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2.1 Sensor Network Applications 
 
Sensor devices have on-board sensing circuits for various purposes. Sensor devices 
are capable of monitoring wide variety of conditions [24]: 
 
• temperature, 
• humidity, 
• vehicular movement, 
• lightning condition, 
• pressure, 
• soil makeup, 
• noise levels, 
• the presence or absence of certain kinds of objects, 
• mechanical stress levels on attached objects, and 
• characteristics of an object such as speed, direction, and size. 
 
We can categorize sensor network applications as military, environmental, health, 
home and other commercial areas [24]. 
 
• Military applications: Sensors are suitable tools for battlefields and other hostile 
areas because they can be easily deployed and they are low-cost and disposable. 
Sensor networks can be used for monitoring the status of friendly forces and 
availability of ammunition and other equipments. Sensor networks can be 
deployed at strategic areas in order to watch the activities of opposing forces. 
Sensor networks can be incorporated into guidance systems of the intelligent 
ammunition for finer targeting. In addition, sensor networks can be used to 
determine the battle damage, detect nuclear, biological and chemical attack and 
make nuclear reconnaissance. 
 
 7 
• Environmental applications: Sensor networks can be deployed in forests and used 
to detect fires before they spread uncontrollable. Sensor devices may be equipped 
with effective power scavenging methods [26], such as solar cells, because the 
sensors may be left unattended for months and even years. Biocomplexity 
mapping of the environment can be achieved via sensor networks. Ground level 
deployment of sensor networks can be especially useful for observing small size 
biodiversity in an ecosystem [27, 28].  Another environmental application of 
sensor networks is flood detection [29]. An example of real life deployment of 
sensor networks for flood detection is the ALERT system [30] deployed in the 
USA.  
 
• Health applications: Sensor networks can be used to monitor human 
physiological data and this data can be stored for a long period [31, 32]. Real-
time health data can help doctors to identify predefined symptoms earlier. In 
addition, sensor networks can be used in hospitals to track doctors and patients.  
 
• Home applications: Smart sensor nodes can be integrated with home appliances 
and they can interact with each other and other entities via networks, such as the 
Internet [33]. Sensor devices can help users to control their domestic devices 
remotely or sensor devices can automate management of home devices.  
 
• Other commercial applications: Sensor networks are suitable for commercial 
applications such as building virtual keyboards; managing inventory; monitoring 
product quality; constructing smart office spaces; environmental control in office 
buildings; robot control and guidance in automatic manufacturing environments; 
interactive toys; interactive museums; factory  process control and automation; 
monitoring disaster area; smart structures with sensor nodes embedded inside; 
machine diagnosis; transportation; factory instrumentation; local control of 
actuators; detecting and monitoring car thefts; vehicle tracking and detection; and 
instrumentation of semiconductor processing chambers, rotating machinery, wind 
tunnels, and anechoic chambers [34-36]. 
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2.2 Sensor Network Deployment 
 
Deployment and management of large number of unattended and inaccessible sensor 
nodes is a challenging task. Hundreds to several hundred thousands of nodes are deployed 
throughout the sensor field. They are deployed within tens of feet of each other [40] and the 
node densities may be as high as 20 nodes/m3 [39].  
 
Sensor nodes can be deployed in groups or one by one. Deployment groups can be 
either bundles or lines of nodes; whichever method is used, the objective is to cover the 
deployment area with nodes evenly. Sensor nodes can be deployed by [24] 
 
• dropping from a plane, 
• delivering in an artillery shell, rocket or missile, 
• throwing by a catapult (from a ship board, etc.), 
• placing in factory, and 
• placing one by one either by a human or a robot. 
 
 After deployment, sensor network topology may change due to the following 
changes in sensor nodes’ [24] 
 
• position, 
• reachability (due to jamming, noise, moving obstacles, etc.), 
• available energy, 
• malfunctioning, and 
• task details. 
 
2.3 Hardware in Sensor Networks 
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A sensor device is made of four main parts: a sensing unit, a processing & memory 
unit, a transceiver unit and a power unit. In addition, a sensor device may be attached with 
an optional location finding system, a mobilizer or a power generator [24]. A typical sensor 
node is depicted in Figure 2.1.  
 
 
Figure 2-1 A typical sensor device 
 
Smart dust mote and µAMPS are two prototype sensor devices. The processing unit of 
a smart dust mote prototype is a 4 MHz Atmel AVR8535 micro-controller with 8 KB 
instruction flash memory, 512 bytes RAM and 512 bytes EEPROM [41]. TinyOS operating 
system runs on this sensor, which has 3500 bytes OS code space and 4500 bytes available 
code space. µAMPS, another sensor node prototype, utilizes a  59–206 MHz SA-1110 
micro-processor. A multithreaded µ-OS operating system runs on µAMPS wireless sensor 
nodes [39].  
 
It is crucial for sensor nodes to have low power and energy efficient processing units, 
since sensors have limited energy sources. As pointed in [44], low power is a quality of a 
device that indicates low energy consumption per clock cycle and energy-efficiency is a 
quality of a device that indicates low energy consumption per instruction. For example, 
ATMega128L @ 4MHz consumes 16.5 mW and ARM Thumb @ 40 MHz consumes 75 
mW. However, the energy efficiency of ATMega128L @ 4MHz is 242 MIPS/W, spending 
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4nJ/Instruction and the efficiency of ARM Thumb @ 40 MHz is 480 MIPS/W, spending 
only 2.1 nJ/Instruction [45]. In Table 2.1, we show energy efficiencies of several 
microprocessors taken from [45]. 
 
Table 2-1 Energy efficiency comparison 
Processor Unit nJ/Instruction 
Cygnal C8051F300 @ 32 KHz, 3.3V 
IBM 405LP @ 152 MHz, 1.0V 
Cygnal C8051F300 @ 25MHz, 3.3V 
TMS320VC5510 @ 200 MHz, 1.5V 
Xscale PXA250 @ 400 MHz, 1.3V 
IBM 405LP @ 380 MHz, 1.8V 
Xscale PXA250 @ 130 MHz, .85V 
0.2 nJ/Instruction 
0.35 nJ/Instruction 
0.5 nJ/Instruction 
0.8 nJ/Instruction 
1.1 nJ/Instruction 
1.3 nJ/Instruction 
1.9 nJ/Instruction 
 
Sensor nodes have a limited functional life. Because of sensor devices’ small size, 
their power sources are very scarce and because it is not possible to recharge nodes’ 
batteries, when a node runs out of power, it is considered dead. Possible battery types for 
sensor nodes include NiCd, NiZn, AgZn, NiMh, and Lithium-Ion. They can be further 
divided as rechargeable and non- rechargeable batteries. It is possible to extend the battery 
life by using energy scavenging techniques such as solar cells or extracting electrical 
energy from vibrations [44]. Transceiver components require complex circuitry and 
consume most of the energy in a duty cycle of a node.  
 
2.4 Communication in Sensor Networks 
 
Communication between sensor nodes is in multi-hop fashion and nodes are linked by 
a wireless medium. The most preferred communication media for sensor networks is radio, 
however infrared and optical media are available options. For RF (radio frequency) 
communication in sensor nodes, small-sized, low-cost, ultra low power transceivers are 
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required. Choice of carrier frequency is bounded by the trade-off between antenna 
efficiency and power consumption limit [42].  
 
A suitable carrier frequency band for sensor networks is the industrial, scientific and 
medical (ISM) band, which offers license-free communication in most countries. Some 
frequency bands that may be made available for ISM applications are listed in Table 2.2. 
The main advantage of using ISM bands is that there is no standards enforced for ISM 
bands and power saving strategies can be freely incorporated into transceivers. However, 
there are some rules for using unregulated bands, such as power limitations and 
interference control. As a sample RF design, we can give µAMPS’s radio. It uses a 
Bluetooth-compatible 2.4 GHz transceiver with an integrated frequency synthesizer [39].  
 
A very desirable property of a radio system for sensor devices is the wake-up 
property. A wake-up radio can receive a very simple signal and detect whether a 
communication with its own node is desired. In this case, it can power up the main radio 
that will then receive the actual communication. Sensors periodically turn off their 
components, primarily the transceiver, in order to sustain a long battery life. For example, 
Berkley’s mica mote has to run at 1% duty cycle in order to last for a year [48]. However, 
turning of the radio means that some nodes may not be able receive critical messages. 
Keeping the radio in listening state is impractical because radio consumes considerable 
amount of energy while waiting in receiving mode. For example, Chipcon’s CC1000 radio 
consumes 16.5 mA in transmit mode and 9.6 mA in receive mode [45]. Hence, it is 
desirable to have an ultra low power communication channel to wake up neighboring nodes 
on demand. A radio system with wake-up property is the PicoRadio developed by Berkeley 
Wireless Research Center [46].  
 
Another communication media for sensors is infrared. Infrared communication is 
license-free and effective against interferences from other electrical appliances. Because 
infrared communication technology is well developed and used in many electronical 
devices, infrared-based transceivers are cheap and easy to build. The main drawback of 
infrared is that it requires a line of sight between sender and receiver. Another alternative 
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of RF communication is optical systems. In [43], two optical communication systems for 
sensor networks are discussed. The first one uses corner-cube retroreflector (CCR) and the 
system does not require an onboard light source. A configuration of three mirrors is used to 
communicate a digital high or low. The second one uses laser diodes and active-steered 
mirrors.  
 
Table 2-2 Freely available ISM frequency bands 
Frequency Bands Center Frequency 
6765–6795 kHz 
13,553–13,567 kHz 
26,957–27,283 kHz 
40.66–40.70 MHz 
433.05–434.79 MHz 
902–928 MHz 
2400–2500 MHz 
5725–5875 MHz 
24–24.25 GHz 
61–61.5 GHz 
122–123 GHz 
244–246 GHz 
6780 kHz 
13,560 kHz 
27,120 kHz 
40.68 MHz 
433.92 MHz 
915 MHz 
2450 MHz 
5800 MHz 
24.125 GHz 
61.25 GHz 
122.5 GHz 
245 GHz 
 
2.5 Security Issues in Sensor Networks 
 
When sensor nodes are deployed at hostile environments, security becomes 
necessary. Adversaries may listen to communication channels, add nodes to the sensor 
network or physically capture nodes. Hence, sensor networks require security measures like 
secure communication, intrusion detection, key revocation and node capture detection. 
However, there are limitations for security in WSN [22]:  
 
1) wireless nature of communication,  
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2) resource limitation on sensor nodes,  
3) very large and dense WSN,  
4) lack of fixed infrastructure,  
5) unknown network topology prior to deployment,  
6) high risk of physical attacks to unattended sensors. 
 
While sensor nodes have limited capabilities, adversaries can have powerful 
computers and extensive communication devices. They can easily move among sensor 
nodes using laptops with high capacity batteries. Adversaries have the capability to 
physically capture, damage or replace sensor nodes. Wireless nature of communication 
makes it easy for adversaries to eavesdrop on radio messages. Content of radio messages 
can be classified into four categories: (i) sensor readings, (ii) mobile code, (iii) key 
management, and (iv) location information [22].   
 
2.5.1 Security Requirements 
 
Wireless and multi-hop nature of communication makes security requirements of 
sensor networks similar to those of ad-hoc networks [47]. Sensor networks have the 
following general security requirements [22]: 
 
• Availability: ensuring that services offered by the sensor network are available 
whenever demanded. Denial-of-Service (DOS) attacks can deteriorate the 
availability of a sensor network. When considering availability in sensor 
networks, it is important to achieve graceful degradation in the presence of node 
compromise or node failures. 
 
• Authentication: verifying identity of other nodes, base stations or any other type 
of nodes before granting a limited resource, or sending information. 
Authentication prevents outsiders from inserting or spoofing messages.  
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• Integrity: ensuring that exchanged messages are not altered or corrupted; receiver 
gets exactly what the sender sends.  
 
• Secrecy: providing privacy of the wireless communication channels to prevent 
any kind of passive attacks. Any appropriate encryption function and a shared key 
between communicating parties can be used to achieve secrecy. 
 
• Non-repudiation: preventing malicious nodes from hiding their activities. 
  
Sensor networks differ from ad-hoc networks in properties like limited and scarce 
resources and unattended operation. Thus, sensor networks have the following specific 
requirements [22]: 
 
• Survivability: ability to provide a minimum level of service in the presence of 
power loss, failures or attacks. 
 
• Degradation of security services: ability to change security level as resource 
availability changes. 
 
2.5.2 Attacks against Sensor Networks 
 
Attacks against sensor networks can be broadly divided into two categories: insider 
and outsider attacks.  
 
• Outsider attacks: An outsider adversary can be defined as unauthorized 
participant of the sensor network. An outsider adversary can launch passive 
attacks, like eavesdropping on the network’s radio channels, in order to steal 
sensitive information. In addition, the adversary can alter or spoof messages or 
inject interfering signals to the network’s radio channel in order to jam the 
network. A form of active attack, which an outsider can perform, is to disable 
sensor nodes. This can be achieved by sending junk packets to a node and 
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draining its energy. Furthermore, adversary can physically capture or destroy 
sensors [49].    
 
• Insider attacks: A significant threat to sensor networks is node compromise. 
Using compromised nodes, an adversary can perform insider attacks. Insider 
attacks are more critical than outsider attacks because in an insider attack, original 
nodes of a network are used and authentication techniques fail to detect 
compromised nodes. The adversary can reprogram and deploy back compromised 
nodes to disrupt the services of the sensor network or steal private data. In 
addition, the adversary can use authentic information compromised from a node 
to fake a more powerful device, like a laptop, as an original member of the sensor 
network. Using compromised nodes in coordination, an adversary can perform 
more harmful attacks to the sensor networks, as we will describe in the following 
section.    
 
Some of the major attacks against sensor networks are as follow [48]: 
 
• Spoofed, altered, or replayed messages 
• Selective forwarding  
• Sinkhole attacks 
• Sybil attacks 
• Wormholes  
• HELLO flood attacks 
• Acknowledgement spoofing 
 
2.5.3 Spoofed, Altered, or Replayed Messages 
 
An outsider adversary can attack routing mechanism of the network by spoofing, 
altering or replaying routing messages. Without proper countermeasures, the adversary can 
harm the sensor network easily by creating routing loops, attracting or repelling network 
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traffic, extending or shortening source routes, generating false error messages, partitioning 
the network, increasing end-to-end latency, etc. [48].  
 
An outsider attacker can be stopped by employing encryption and authentication on 
communication. An adversary cannot spoof or alter any messages unless he knows the 
shared key. However, an insider adversary can maliciously spoof, alter or replay messages 
since he has the required cryptographic materials. 
 
2.5.4 Selective Forwarding 
 
In sensor networks, there may be one or more sinks and sensors forward sensing data 
to the sinks hop-by-hop. In such a multi-hop network, it is assumed that sensors faithfully 
forward the received messages toward the nearest sink. However, in a selective forwarding 
attack, the adversary drops some of the messages it receives. In order to perform a selective 
forwarding attack, first the adversary must include itself into a path of data. After doing 
that, the adversary can simply drop all the packets it receives, but neighbors can easily 
assume that the malicious node is a failed node and find another route. The adversary can 
harm the sensor network for a long time by selectively dropping some of the messages and 
forwarding the rest of the messages. An adversary can include itself to path of data by 
sinkhole and Sybil attacks, which we will discuss in the next two sections.    
 
2.5.5 Sybil Attack 
 
In [50], the Sybil attack is defined as the action of a malicious device illegitimately 
taking on multiple identities. We refer to a malicious device's additional identities as Sybil 
nodes. An adversary can effectively disturb and harm fault-tolerant schemes such as 
distributed storage [51], dispersity [52] and multipath [53] routing and data aggregation, 
using the Sybil attack.  
 
A Sybil node can get new identities by either fabricating random identities or stealing 
identities of existing legitimate nodes. If the sensor network has a mechanism to check 
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identities, the adversary has to steal IDs from compromised nodes. In a multipath or 
dispersity routing protocol, seemingly disjoint paths could in fact go through a single 
malicious node presenting several Sybil identities. The Sybil attack can be used in 
coordination with other attacks; attackers can use the Sybil attack to evade misbehavior 
detection mechanisms. The Sybil node can “split the blame” [50] by acting maliciously 
using multiple identities and not having any of the Sybil identities to misbehave enough for 
the system to take action. In order to prevent a Sybil attack, the keys must be generated and 
distributed such that nodes can validate each other’s identities.     
 
2.5.6 Sinkhole Attack 
 
An adversary can use the sinkhole attack to attract some part or all of the 
communication to a particular node or group of nodes. After successfully creating a 
sinkhole, the adversary can launch a selective forwarding attack. 
 
Sinkholes can be created by making a node look attractive to other nodes in terms of 
routing. A malicious node can advertise a high quality link to the sink by either spoofing or 
replaying routing messages. Some of the routing protocols may actually verify the speed 
and reliability of the advertised link by end-to-end acknowledgements containing latency 
information. In this case, the adversary can actually establish a high quality link to the sink 
using a device with a powerful transceiver, e.g. laptop, or use wormhole attack, as 
described in the next section.  
 
Due to the real or imaginary high quality link to the sink, surrounding nodes send 
their messages, destined to the sink, to the malicious node. The sinkhole’s area of influence 
may cover several hops away from the malicious node because routing advertisements 
propagate through the sensor network. An attacker can easily perform selective forwarding 
attack using sinkholes and drop any of the packets send from its area of influence.    
 
2.5.7 Wormhole Attack 
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In the wormhole attack, an adversary tunnels messages received in one part of the 
network over a low latency link and replays them in a different part [48]. The adversary can 
easily establish a fast link by employing powerful transceivers or optical links. It is very 
easy to build a basic wormhole; even no node compromise is required. The adversary can 
replay packets received from one particular node at another part of the network. It is more 
effective if one end of the wormhole is near the sink and the other end is away from sink. 
The attacker can convince nodes away from the sink that they are only a few hops away 
from the sink using the wormhole. If the adversary’s wormhole creates an out-of-band 
route to the sink, which is significantly better than alternative routes, all the surrounding 
nodes will prefer the wormhole. Attacker can use the wormhole in order to create a 
sinkhole, see Figure 2.2.  
 
Wormholes are difficult to cope with because a wormhole can be created even if 
sensor messages are encrypted and authentication methods are used. Detection of 
wormholes is even more difficult when it used in conjunction with Sybil attack. 
Compromised nodes at the ends of the wormhole can pretend to be a cluster of nodes. An 
adversary can harm the sensor network by using the wormhole attack in combination with 
selective forwarding.  
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Figure 2-2 An adversary using a wormhole to create a sinkhole. 
 
2.5.8 HELLO Flood Attack 
 
HELLO messages are required in most of the protocols’ bootstrapping phase; nodes 
announce themselves to their neighbors via HELLO messages. A node receiving such a 
HELLO message thinks that it has a one-hop neighbor. However, it may be wrong; a 
laptop-class attacker with enough transmission power can trick sensor nodes away from the 
attacker to believe that the attacker is their one-hop neighbor [48]. Similar to a wormhole 
attack, if the attacker resides near the sink, it can convince other nodes that they can send 
packets in several hops using the malicious node of the attacker. However, when sensor 
nodes, sufficiently far away from the adversary, try to send packets to attacker, their 
packets will be lost.  
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 HELLO flood attack is especially effective against protocols that depend on localized 
information exchange between neighboring nodes for topology maintenance or flow 
control. The adversary does not necessarily need to compromise nodes and create 
legitimate broadcast messages. It can simply replay overheard HELLO messages with 
enough power to be heard over a large area.  HELLO floods can also be thought of as one-
way, broadcast wormholes [48]. 
 
2.5.9 Acknowledgement Spoofing  
 
Some of the protocols for sensor networks rely on implicit or explicit 
acknowledgements. For routing protocols, acknowledgments can determine the quality and 
reliability of link. In a sensor network, an adversary can easily spoof acknowledgements of 
overheard messages addressed to neighboring nodes.   
 
An attacker can use acknowledgement-spoofing method to convince sensor nodes that 
a weak link is strong and a depleted or dead node is still functional [48]. Sensor nodes may 
think that their messages are received at the other end of the link; however, their messages 
are actually lost. With acknowledgement spoofing, an attacker can mount a selective 
forwarding attack by encouraging the target node to transmit packets on those links. 
 
2.6 Previous Work on Key Distribution Mechanisms  
 
In this section, we give detailed description of some of the major key predistribution 
schemes. In sensor networks, nodes use predistributed keys directly or generate pairwise 
keys using given cryptographic material. The challenge is to distribute keys or keying 
materials efficiently. Key distribution mechanisms are essentially trade-offs between 
resiliency and resource-consumption; the more resources, in terms of memory, 
computational complexity and communication cost, are utilized for security, the harder for 
the attackers to compromise nodes and harm the sensor network. Different key distribution 
mechanisms propose trade-offs of varying nature. At one end of the trade-off, we can 
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achieve minimum cost with very poor security by using one global key, such that every 
node shares the same key with all other nodes. Resource allocation is minimal because, 
each node has to store only one key. On the other hand, even if only one node is 
compromised, all the secure links are compromised. In the following sections, we describe 
some of the major key predistribution schemes and we classify them according to their 
proposed keying styles, similar to the classification in [22]. 
 
2.6.1 Pair-wise Key Predistribution Solutions 
 
Chan et al proposes random pairwise key scheme in [7], which trades off high 
resiliency for inefficient memory usage. According to Erdös and Renyi’s work [19], we can 
calculate the smallest probability p that any two nodes are connected such that the entire 
graph is connected with high probability c. To achieve this probability p in a network with 
N nodes, each node needs to store only a random set of Np pairwise keys instead of 
exhaustively storing all N − 1 [7]. In this scheme, maximum supportable network size, N, 
depends on p and m, number of keys a node can store. 
 
  
p
m
N =  
 
At the key setup phase, identity of each node is matched up with randomly selected m 
other node identities. A pairwise key is generated for each pair of nodes and then, the key is 
stored in that pair of nodes’ memory, along with the ID of the other node. At the shared key 
discovery phase, each node broadcasts its ID; therefore, each node sends one message, and 
receives one message from each node within its radio range. A node can determine if it 
shares pairwise keys with its neighbors by searching their IDs in its key ring.  
 
Random pairwise keys scheme has node-to-node authentication property. Because 
node IDs and matching pairwise keys are pre-deployed, a node can easily determine the 
identity of its neighbor by searching its own key ring. In addition, because each pairwise 
key is uniquely created for each pair, nodes can be sure of their neighbors’ identities. 
 22 
Furthermore, random pairwise keys scheme has perfect resiliency against node capture. 
Since each pairwise key is unique, capture of any node does not allow the adversary to 
decrypt any additional communications in the network besides the ones that the 
compromised node is directly involved. 
 
Liu and Ning proposes closest (location-based) pair-wise keys pre-distribution 
scheme in [11]. Their scheme is an improvement on Chan et al’s random pairwise key 
scheme, that takes advantage of location information. Sensor nodes are deployed in a 
rectangular area. Each node has an expected location, which can be predicted and 
predetermined. After deployment, sensor nodes reside in their actual location. The 
difference between expected location and actual location of is the deployment error, which 
can be modeled by a probability density function. The nearer two nodes have their expected 
locations, the more probable they are in the communication range of each other. The idea is 
to make each sensor share pair-wise keys with its c closest neighbors.  
 
In [11], Liu and Ning present a basic and an extended version of their key 
predistribution scheme. In the extended version, they use a technique based on a pseudo 
random function (PRF) and a master key shared between each sensor and the setup server. 
Their scheme achieves a small and fixed storage overhead in each sensor no matter how the 
sensors are deployed, and no extra communication overhead is introduced during the 
addition of new sensors. At the key setup phase, for each sensor u, the setup server 
randomly generates a master key Ku and randomly selects a set S, with size c, of other 
sensor whose expected locations are closest to that of u. Then, for each node Sv∈ , the 
setup server generates a pairwise key shared between v and u, ku,v, using master key of v 
and ID of u: ku,v = PRFKv (u). Node u stores the pairwise key, while node v can generate ku,v 
using the PRF, its master key and ID of u. In this scheme, sensor addition is easy, a new 
node a can be preloaded with pairwise keys generated with master keys of c nodes, nearest 
to node a’s expected location.  
 
Liu and Ning’s key predistribution scheme decreases memory usage, and performs a 
good key connectivity if deployment errors are low. Similar to Chan et al’s random 
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pairwise key scheme, this scheme has very good resiliency. However, it introduces a 
computational overhead such that nodes have to compute pairwise keys using a PRF for 
some cases.  
  
2.6.2 Random Key-Chain Based Key Predistribution Solutions 
 
Eschenauer and Gligor proposed a basic probabilistic key pre-distribution scheme in 
[1]. Their scheme uses a randomized approach in order to achieve a well-connected sensor 
network with reasonable security. Theoretically, the basic scheme is based on Erdös and 
Renyi’s work [19]. According to Erdös and Renyi’s work, for monotone properties, there 
exists a value of p, which is the probability that there exists a shared key between any two 
nodes, such that the property that the random graph is connected moves from “nonexistent” 
to “certainly true” in a very large random graph. A uniformly distributed sensor network 
with large number of nodes forms a random graph, which Erdös and Renyi’s theory 
applies.  
 
At the key predistribution phase, a setup server randomly generates a large pool of P 
keys with their identities. For each sensor node, setup server draws k keys and stores these 
keys and their IDs in that node. These k keys form a node’s key ring. At the shared key 
discovery phase, nodes broadcast the key IDs in their key rings. If two neighboring nodes 
have a shared key, they can directly use that key to secure their communication. The third 
step is the path key establishment phase. In this phase, path-keys are generated for pairs of 
neighboring sensor nodes that do not share any keys but are connected by two or more 
links at the end of the shared-key discovery phase. One of the nodes sends a randomly 
generated key to the other node over a path of secure links. All the sensor nodes must finish 
the shared key discovery phase in order to begin path-key establishment phase. 
 
In an attack against the sensor network, an adversary can physically capture nodes 
and have complete control over captured nodes. When an adversary captures a node, he 
obtains only k keys of a single key ring, which means he has a probability of approximately 
k/P to attack successfully any link in the sensor network.  
 24 
 
It is desirable to have a sensor network, whose secure links form a highly connected 
random graph. If p is defined as the probability that a shared key exists between any two 
sensor nodes, and N is the number of network nodes, then d = p (N − 1) is the expected 
degree of a node, i.e. the average number of edges connecting that node with its neighbors. 
When p is zero, there is no edge in the network and when p is one, the network is fully 
connected. The connectivity of the sensor network depends on the key ring size, k, global 
key pool size, P, and the network of size, N. Using the Erdös and Renyi’s work on random 
graph theory, it can be found that desired probability Pc for  graph connectivity is: 
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we can calculate the required p and d, node degree, for a desired Pc value. Also, note that, 
because of wireless radio communication limits, the number of neighbors of a node, n’, is 
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For example, when size of the key pool, P, is 10000 keys, only 75 keys are needed to 
be stored into key rings in order to have p equal to 0.5. If key pool enlarged 10 times, 
P=100000, the required key ring size becomes 250, which is only 3.3 times larger than the 
previous case.  
 
There have been proposals to improve the security of links and resiliency in 
Eschenauer and Gligor’s basic scheme. One approach is to increase the minimum number 
of shared keys required in the shared key discovery phase. This approach is presented by 
Chan et al in [7] as q-composite random key predistribution scheme. In the basic scheme, 
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any two neighboring nodes need to find a single common key from their key rings to 
establish a secure link. In the q-composite scheme, q common keys are required, where 
q>1. At the shared key discovery phase, a secure link, Ka, b, key between node a and node b 
is set as the hash of all common keys Ka, b = hash (K1 || K2 || K3 || . . . || Kq’), where q’ is the 
number of shared keys between node a and b, q’ > q.  
 
As the amount of key overlap, q, increases, it becomes exponentially harder for an 
attacker with a given key set to break a link. However, in order to keep the probability p 
that any two nodes can establish a secure link the same, either key pool size, P, has to be 
decreased or number of keys in a key ring, k, has to be increased. Either way, the attacker 
gains a larger portion of the key pool with each node capture. For small-scale attacks, q-
composite scheme provides improved node capture resiliency. However, as the number of 
captured nodes increases, it becomes easier for the attacker to compromise new links.  
 
One way to improve the performance of key predistribution schemes is to prevent 
nodes that are far away from carrying common keys in their key rings. This can be 
achieving by using location information. Du et al propose a location-aware scheme, key 
predistribution using deployment knowledge, in [8]. Du et al, present a group-based 
deployment model and a key predistribution scheme in their paper.  
 
The group-based deployment model is described in [8] as follows:  
 
1. N sensor nodes to be deployed are divided into t × n equal size groups so that each 
group, Gi, j, for i =1, . . . , t and j = 1, . . . , n, is deployed from the deployment 
point with index (i, j). Let (xi, yj) represent the deployment point for group Gi, j. 
 
2. The deployment points are arranged in a grid. The key predistribution scheme for 
grid-based deployment can be easily extended to different deployment strategies.  
 
 26 
3. During deployment, the resident points of the node k in group Gi, j, follow the 
probability distribution function f ijk (x, y | k ∈  Gi,j) = f (x − xi, y − yj). The pdf 
f(x,y) used in this paper is the two dimensional Gaussian distribution. 
 
At the key predistribution phase, a global key pool S is randomly created with size |S|. 
Then S is divided into t × n key pools, Si,j (for i = 1, . . . , t and j = 1, . . . , n). Each 
vertically or horizontally or diagonally neighboring key pool, Si,j , shares a certain number 
of keys. The scheme defines overlapping factors a and b such that two horizontally or 
vertically neighboring key pools share exactly a| Sc | keys, where 0 ≤ a ≤ 0.25. Two 
diagonally neighboring key pools share exactly b| Sc | keys, where 0 ≤ b ≤ 0.25 and 4a + 4b 
= 1. Two non-neighboring key pools share no keys. The key pool setup is summarized in 
Figure 2.3. After key pools are setup, for each node, m keys are selected from the 
corresponding key pool and loaded into that node’s key ring.  
 
The shared key discovery phase is similar to that of Eschenauer and Gligor’s [1]. 
Sensor nodes broadcast their key ring and if two neighboring nodes share one or more 
keys, then they have a secure link. Two nodes from different zones can also establish a 
direct link because key pools are setup such that they have common keys. As overlapping 
factors a and b increases, the probability that any two nodes from neighboring zones share 
a key increases. Du et al’s scheme has very good connectivity and node capture resiliency 
performances.  
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Figure 2-3 Shared keys between neighboring key pools. 
  
2.6.3 Key Matrix Based Dynamic Key Generation Solutions 
. 
Instead of storing keys into sensor nodes’ key ring and letting nodes to directly use 
them for encrypting messages, it is possible to store a small amount of information to each 
sensor node so that every pair of nodes can calculate a pairwise key, and use it as the link 
key.  
 
Blom proposed a key pre-distribution scheme in [2] that allows any pair of nodes to 
find a secret pairwise key between them. Compared to the (N−1)-pairwise-key 
predistribution scheme, where N is the number of nodes in the sensor network and each 
node has pairwise keys with every other node, Blom’s scheme only uses λ+1 memory 
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spaces with λ much smaller than N. The tradeoff is that, unlike the (N−1)-pairwise-key 
scheme, Blom’s scheme is not perfectly resilient against node capture. Instead it has λ-
secure property, which is explained in [9] as: as long as an adversary compromises less 
than or equal to λ nodes, uncompromised nodes are perfectly secure; when an adversary 
compromises more than λ nodes, all pairwise keys of the entire network are compromised. 
Apparently, a larger λ leads to a more secure network. However, there is a tradeoff between 
λ and memory usage. The parameter λ determines the amount of information stored into 
sensor nodes’ memory. As λ increases, memory usage grows, too.  
 
Blom’s scheme uses a public (λ + 1) × N matrix G and a private (λ + 1) × (λ + 1) 
symmetric matrix D which is generated over GF(q). Matrix G must have (λ + 1) linearly 
independent columns to provide λ-secure property. N × (λ + 1) matrix A is generated as A = 
(D · G)T, where (D · G)T is the transpose of (D · G). Matrix D is completely secret, setup 
server does not share with any other entity, whereas, one row of matrix A will be disclosed 
to each node in the sensor network. The key matrix is defined as a symmetric N × N matrix 
K = A · G = (D · G)T · G. For the matrix K, Kij = Kji, where Kij is the element located in the 
i
th row and jth column of matrix K. Figure 2.4 illustrates how matrix K is generated.  
 
For each node si, where i =1, … , N, Blom’s scheme distributes  
 
1. ith column of matrix G, Gi, which is a vector of size λ + 1,  
 
2. ith row of matrix A, Ai, which is a vector of size λ + 1.  
 
When two neighboring nodes, si and sj, wants to setup a secure link, they first 
exchange their public columns of matrix G. Then, their shared key is generated as Kij = Ai × 
Gj and Kji = Aj × Gi. The shared secret key generated is shown in Figure 2.4.  
 
As a result, two nodes compute the same secret key by exchanging only columns of 
matrix G, which is public information. λ-secure property guarantees that no nodes other 
than si  and sj can compute Kij or Kji if no more than λ nodes are compromised. The cost of a 
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single shared key generation for each node is 1) multiplication of two vectors of size λ + 1 
where the elements of the vectors are as large as the corresponding cryptographic key size, 
2) transmission of a  λ + 1 element vector. 
 
 
Figure 2-4 Matrix A, G and K in Blom’s scheme. 
 
Du et al proposes multiple-space key predistribution scheme [9] that uses Blom’s 
scheme as a building block and improves its resiliency. A key space is defined as a tuple 
(D, G), where matrices D and G are as defined in Blom’s scheme.  
 
At the key predistribution phase, Du et al propose generating ω key spaces, where 
ω>2. A single public G matrix and a set of ω private D matrices are generated. These 
matrices form ω key spaces Si = (G, Di), where i = 1, …, ω. Then, for each key space, 
matrix A is computed, Ai = (Di · G)
T, where i = 1, …, ω. For each sensor node, a set of τ 
spaces are randomly selected among these ω spaces, 2 ≤ τ < ω. Matrix shares for each 
selected space are stored to the sensor node as in Blom’s scheme. 
 
At the key agreement phase, sensor nodes exchange IDs of key spaces they store and 
discover whether they share any spaces with their neighbors. If any two nodes have a key 
space in common, they can generate a pairwise secret key using the Blom’s scheme. It is 
possible that two neighboring nodes do not share a common space, in that case, they have 
to apply path-key establishment phase to establish a key through intermediate nodes.  
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Connectivity of the sensor network depends on ω and τ, as more key spaces are stored 
in a node, the possibility of having common key spaces with neighboring nodes increases. 
Note that, parameters ω and τ do not alone determine the memory cost. By keeping ω and τ 
fixed, and by changing only λ, we can change the memory cost for each node and the 
resiliency of the sensor network, while keeping the connectivity of the network the same. A 
node carries τ +1 vectors of size λ+1.  
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3 TWO-TIER LOCATION AWARE KEY PREDISTRIBUTION SCHEME 
  
 
In this section, we give a detailed description of our key predistribution scheme. In 
our scheme, we exploit the predeployment knowledge of sensor nodes in order to improve 
the performance of key predistribution. In an ideal key distribution scenario, a node should 
store shared keys with only its neighbors in its memory; there should not be any unused 
keys. Therefore, the memory of a sensor device, which is a scarce resource in sensor 
devices, would not be wasted. However, it is not possible to predict the precise location of 
sensor nodes and their neighbors before deployment, but we can keep the nodes near to a 
target location by deploying them in bundles. We arrange target locations in a grid fashion 
and we determine which bundle will be deployed at which target location. We call each cell 
of the grid a zone and center of each zone is the target location of deployment. Before 
deployment, separate key spaces are created for each zone according to our key 
predistribution scheme, which will be described in detail in the following sections. Using 
this method, we can have probabilistic information on the neighbors of a node.  By utilizing 
this probabilistic location information about sensor nodes in our key predistribution 
scheme, we increase the average number of shared keys between nodes and lower the 
required memory size. 
 
We employ a two-tier approach in our key predistribution scheme; there are special 
sensor nodes in each zone with larger memory and better power source. We call these 
special nodes, agent nodes. Agent nodes are required to establish secure links between 
sensor nodes from neighboring zones. A secure link exists between two nodes if they both 
own at least one key in common and if they are neighbors.  
 
Let us define the parameters and symbols used in this scheme: 
 
  N number of nodes in each zone 
  Z  number of zones in the sensor network 
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  ω         number of key spaces for each zone  
  τ number of key spaces installed in a regular node 
  λ+1 number of columns (rows) in matrix A (G) (see Section 2.6.3 for   
   further details on matrix A and G) 
  R  communication range for sensor nodes (in meters) 
  Az number of agent nodes in each zone 
  sij ID of j
th sensor node in zone i 
  rij resident point of node sij  
  m size of each element in G matrix and size of a pairwise key in bits 
  kij ID of j
th key space in zone i 
  Zij ID of zone at i
th row and jth column 
  dij deployment point at zone Zij 
  Gij  ID of group deployed at dij 
 
Our location-aware key predistribution scheme consists of four phases: 
  
• First phase is the predistribution phase, where keys are stored in nodes according 
to two different methods. The first method is the intra-zone key predistribution 
method and it is applied to all sensor nodes, both regular and agent nodes. The 
second method is the inter-zone key predistribution method; this method is 
applied only to agent nodes.  
 
• Second phase is the direct key establishment phase, where nodes discover their 
neighbors and find out if they share common key spaces with their neighbors to 
form secure links. If they share a common key space, they generate a common 
pairwise key using Blom’s scheme [2].  
 
• In the third phase, nodes use the hybrid key establishment method. In hybrid key 
establishment method, secure links between regular nodes and agent nodes are 
established. In this hybrid method, nodes use keying material distributed at the 
intra-zone key predistribution phase. 
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• Fourth phase is the path key establishment phase, where nodes try to find secure 
paths to their neighbors, with which they do not share common key spaces, in 
order to establish secure link. In the path key establishment phase, sensor nodes 
initiate intra-zone path key establishment process to establish path keys with same 
zone neighbors and inter-zone path key establishment process to establish path 
keys with nodes from neighboring zones.   
 
3.1 Zone-Based Deployment Model 
 
In sensor networks, it may be possible to predict the locations of sensor nodes to a 
certain degree. If we can determine the locations of sensor nodes precisely, we can store 
cryptographic material in sensor devices such that they can establish pairwise shared keys 
with their neighbors and avoid using unnecessary memory for nodes away from their 
communication range. This way, we can achieve optimal key predistribution and have high 
connectivity and strong resiliency results. However, determining locations of large number 
of sensor nodes in advance is very difficult. One way to deploy sensors at precise locations 
is placing them by hand, but it is not a practical approach. Nevertheless, we can have a 
probabilistic knowledge on the location of sensor nodes.  
 
In our deployment model, we divide sensor nodes into yx zz ×  equal sized groups and 
the target deployment area is a rectangular region with length X and width Y. Then, we 
arrange the deployment area into a grid with yx zz × equal sized zones. Center point of zone 
Zij is the deployment point, dij of group Gij, where i = 1, …, zx and j = 1, …, zy.  Using a 
plane, we drop group Gij over deployment point dij. The actual location of sensor nodes 
after deployment is named as their resident points, rij where i = 1, …, Z and j = 1, …, N. 
Note that each sensor node has a resident point, whereas sensor node groups have 
deployment points. Resident points of sensor nodes in the same group follow the same 
probability distribution function. 
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If the probability distribution function is uniform distribution, any node can be 
located anywhere, regardless of its deployment point. However, uniform distribution does 
not provide a realistic deployment model. Thus, in our deployment model we employ two-
dimensional Gaussian distribution. Using a Gaussian distribution, sensor nodes dropped at 
the same deployment point tend to be closer to each other and we can deduce a probability 
on the locations of sensor nodes. 
 
We can determine probability of a node being at a resident point based on its 
deployment point using the Gaussian distribution function. When mean of the Gaussian 
distribution (µ) equals to the deployment point dij = (x, y) and standard deviation is σ, the 
probability of a node to have a resident point at rij = (x', y') is given as follows. 
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It is desirable in our deployment model to distribute sensor nodes over the 
deployment area as evenly as possible. In Gaussian distribution, the distance between 
mean, which is the deployment point, and the resident point for a node is less than 3σ with 
probability 0.9987. Therefore, it is important to pick proper parameters for distance 
between neighboring deployment points and σ to create an evenly distributed sensor 
network. Because we use Gaussian distribution, we know that nodes in the same group will 
most probably be near to each other and using this information, we can increase 
connectivity by storing cryptographic material from same key spaces into same-group 
nodes.  
 
A sample sensor network created using the above distribution formulation where σ = 
10 is plotted in Figure 3.1. The sample sensor network is a 44× grid, each zone is a 
mm 3030 ×  square and center of each zone is the deployment point of a sensor node group. 
There are three agent nodes in each zone; Az = 3. In order to achieve a homogenous 
distribution of sensors, the distance between deployment points is set to 3σ. As shown the 
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figure below, the deployment and corresponding    resident points are deviated according to 
the distribution. 
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Figure 3-1 A sample sensor network, σ=10m, N=30 and distance between adjacent 
deployment points is 3σ 
 
3.2 Predistribution Phase 
 
 In key predistribution phase, we describe the method of how keys are distributed to 
nodes. We define two methods in this phase: intra-zone key predistribution method and 
inter-zone key predistribution method. In intra-zone key predistribution method, setup 
server distributes keys required for establishing secure links between nodes from the same 
zone and intra-zone step applies for both regular nodes and agent nodes. In inter-zone key 
predistribution method, setup server distributes keys to agent nodes so that agent nodes 
from neighboring zones can securely send messages to each other. Note that agent nodes 
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from the same zone can use their cryptographic material installed in the intra-zone step to 
establish secure links between each other.  
 
3.2.1 Intra-zone key predistribution method  
 
 When any two nodes, regular-regular, or regular-agent, or agent-agent, from the 
same zone want to establish secure links with each other, they use cryptographic material 
distributed in this step. In the intra-zone key predistribution method, we use a method that 
is build on Blom’s key predistribution scheme [2], which is explained in Section 2.6.3, and 
Eschenauer and Gligor’s probabilistic and random key predistribution scheme [1]. Using 
this scheme, any two nodes having shares from the same matrix can compute a secret 
pairwise key and use this key to create a secure link. 
 
Setup server generates a single public matrix G, as described in Section 2.6.3, all λ+1 
columns of this matrix are linearly independent. For each zone, setup server generates ω 
random and symmetric D matrices and uses these matrices to compute ω A matrices, each 
A matrix is a )1( +× λN  matrix, and each D and A matrix pair makes up a key space. Each 
key space has a unique ID, kij, where 1 ≤ i ≤ Z and 1 ≤ j ≤ ω. Sensors can use these key 
space IDs to find out if they have common key spaces with their neighbors. Then, for each 
node, sij, setup server picks τ key spaces and stores corresponding row of A matrix and 
corresponding column of G matrix to node sij. For node sij, setup server picks j
th row of 
matrix A and jth column of matrix G.  
 
In order for two neighboring nodes to compute a common key, they need to know 
each other’s public columns in G matrix. Note that each element in G matrix is in finite 
field GF(q), where q is a large prime number. In addition, as described in Section 2.6.3, 
λ+1 columns of matrix G must be linearly independent to have the λ-secure property [2]. 
Setup server can generate all columns of matrix G by using a primitive element in GF(q), 
namely p. It is known that each non-zero element in GF(q) can be computed by some 
power of p; pi, 10 −≤< qi , and when i≠j, pi ≠ pj. Using these facts, it can be seen that it is 
feasible to generate a public G matrix by using a single primitive element:  
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Above G matrix is a form of Vandermonde matrix [18], it can be shown that any λ+1 
columns of the above matrix is linearly independent as long as p, p2, p3, ..., pN are all  
distinct. Therefore, setup server can pick a primitive root, p, of GF(q) and use it to generate 
all columns of G and store a copy of p in all sensor nodes.  
 
At the end of this phase, all nodes will have τ rows and one primitive element stored 
in their memory. These cryptographic materials will occupy ( )( )m11 ++λτ  bits in sensor 
devices’ memory. 
 
3.2.2 Inter-zone key predistribution method 
 
In our key distribution scheme, agent nodes play a crucial role, such that regular 
nodes depend on agent nodes to establish secure links over different zones. We use 
random-pairwise keys to establish common keys between agent nodes.  
 
Before sensor deployment, setup server generates unique random pairwise keys for 
each agent node pair; there are only two copies of a pairwise key. For an agent node sij in 
zone i, setup server generates pairwise keys that sij shares with all agent nodes in 
neighboring zones of zone i. Then, these pairwise keys are stored in sij along with IDs of 
corresponding agent nodes. In Figure 3.2, we show an agent node sharing pairwise keys 
with agent nodes from neighboring zones.  
 
As explained in [7], random pairwise keys have node-to-node authentication property, 
so that agent nodes can verify the identities of other agent nodes they are communicating. 
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Adversaries cannot impersonate an agent node as long as that node is not captured by an 
attacker. Another attractive feature of random pairwise keys is that they have perfect node 
capture resiliency, meaning that when a pairwise key is compromised by adversaries, only 
the secure link, that compromised key is used, is affected. Adversaries cannot compromise 
any other secure link since pairwise keys have only two copies.  
 
At the end of this step, setup server will store mNA neighz ××  bits in each agent node, 
where Nneigh is number of neighboring zones of corresponding zone, 83 ≤≤ neighN . As 
explained in the intra-zone key predistribution step, agent nodes have also ( )( )m11 ++λτ  
bits stored in their memory. Thus, agent nodes must have larger memory than regular 
nodes. Considering that there will be limited number of agent nodes in each zone, this is a 
practical approach. Although random pairwise keys scheme has useful features, like node-
to-node authentication and perfect node capture resiliency, it has the disadvantage of larger 
memory consumption than other key distribution scheme and it is not scalable as the 
number of agent nodes in each zone grows. Again, since agent nodes will be limited in 
number, it is still practical to employ random-pairwise keys. As we will show in the 
following sections, with only eight agent nodes in each zone, our scheme can have very 
high connectivity and “node capture resiliency” performances. In our scheme, expanding 
the sensor network by deploying new zones does not increase the memory cost for agent 
nodes because agent nodes contact with only neighboring zones and number of neighboring 
zones can be at most eight. Thus, scalability problem of random pairwise keys is not 
applicable to our key predistribution scheme. 
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Figure 3-2 Agent nodes share pairwise keys with other agent nodes from neighboring 
zones 
 
3.3 Direct Key Establishment Phase 
 
After deployment, sensor devices try to establish secure links with all of their 
neighbors. Direct key establishment phase explains how sensors can share pairwise keys 
with their neighbors and use these keys to establish secure links. Note that, if two nodes are 
within each other’s communication range, we define these two sensor nodes as neighbors. 
If two neighboring nodes have secure link between them, we define these nodes as secure 
neighbors.  
 
 
Agent nodes 
intra-zone 
keys 
random 
pairwise keys 
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Table 3-1 Direct key establishment methods 
 Regular Node 
(Same zone) 
Agent Node 
(Same zone) 
Regular Node 
(Different zone) 
Agent Node 
(Different zone) 
Regular Node Method 1 Method 1 Method 2 Method 4 
Agent Node Method 1 Method 1 Method 4 Method 3 
 
When two sensor nodes are neighbors and want to establish a secure link, depending 
on node types and zone relationship, one of four methods is used, as shown in Table 3.1. 
We show the possible situations and corresponding methods used in Figure 3.3. 
 
• Method 1: Both sensor devices can be regular nodes or agent nodes and they can be 
from the same zone. If one of the nodes is an agent node, then the agent node uses its 
cryptographic material it received at the intra-zone key predistribution step and acts 
like a regular node. In this case, they have to find out if they share any key spaces. To 
do this, each node broadcasts a message containing the following information: (1) the 
node’s id, (2) the indices of the key spaces it carries. When neighboring sensor nodes, 
sin and sim, receive this message, they can find out if they share a common key space. 
If they do not have a common key space, they can establish a secure link with the help 
of other nodes, which they have secure links with, as we will describe in Section 3.5. 
If sin and sim share a common key space, they can compute a pairwise key as described 
in Section 2.6.3. sin can compute the pairwise key by using its private row from matrix 
A and sim’s column of public matrix G, which sin can generate by using sim’s ID and 
the primitive root, that is already stored in every node. This shared key is called the 
direct key. After computing the direct key, neighboring nodes can use this key to 
establish a secure link and encrypt their communication.  
 
• Method 2: Both of the devices can be regular nodes but they may belong to different 
zones. In this case, they cannot directly establish a secure link because they do not 
have any common key spaces. Only agent nodes from different zones can share a 
pairwise key and communicate securely without help of other nodes. When regular 
nodes, sim and sjn want to establish a secure link, they have to reach their nearest agent. 
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In Section 3.5.2, inter-zone path key establishment process, we describe how two 
regular nodes from different zones can establish a secure link. 
 
• Method 3: Both of the devices can be agent nodes from neighboring zones. In this 
case, they can easily establish a secure link by exchanging IDs. They do not need to 
do any computation; each node can find the pairwise key shared with the other agent 
node just by looking at other node’s ID. They do not need any intermediaries like 
regular nodes from different zones.  
 
• Method 4: One of the sensor nodes can be a regular node, the other node can be an 
agent node, and they may belong to neighboring zones. In this case, they follow the 
inter-zone path key establishment process and during this process, the agent node acts 
like both a regular node and its 0-hop neighbor agent zone.  
 
 
Figure 3-3 Key establishment methods for neighboring nodes 
 
After the direct key establishment phase, the entire sensor network forms a secure 
link graph. In [9], secure link graph is defined as follows: 
Method 1 
Method 1 
Method 2 
Method 4 
Method 1 
Method 3 
 
  Agent node 
      Regular node 
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Let V represent all sensor nodes in the sensor network. In a secure link graph G(V, E) 
two nodes can have a edge between them only if they are neighbors and they share a secret 
key. 
 
3.4 Hybrid Key Establishment Method 
 
After direct key establishment phase, sensor nodes establish secure links with their 
neighbors. If a regular node has a direct key with an agent node, i.e. agent node is a secure 
neighbor of regular node, that node can perform inter-zone key establishment process. In 
case a regular node has no agent node within its radio communication range, i.e. none of 
regular node’s 1-hop neighbors is an agent node; it has to find an agent node within several 
hops range and try to establish a pairwise key using hybrid key establishment method.  
 
Every regular node needs to have a contact with an agent node in order to perform 
inter-zone path key establishment. Some of the regular nodes can find an agent node within 
their communication range. In that case, regular nodes can treat agent nodes like regular 
nodes and establish secure links with neighboring agent node(s) in the direct key 
establishment phase. If the regular node and the agent node do not share any key spaces, 
they can establish a path-key using the method explained in Section 3.5.1.  
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Figure 3-4 Regular node sib establishes a pairwise key with agent node sia using hybrid key 
establishment method 
 
Because there is limited number of agent nodes in each zone, not every regular node 
may be able to find an agent node in 1-hop range. Nevertheless, regular nodes can still 
share key spaces with an agent node and if they can exchange their key space IDs over a 
secure path, they can compute their secret shared key even if they are several hops away. 
As an example, in Figure 3.4, regular node sib has an agent node 3-hops away and tries to 
establish a pairwise key using hybrid key establishment method.  
 
The steps of hybrid key establishment method are as follows: 
 
1. If a regular node, sij, where 1 ≤ i ≤ Z and 1 ≤ j ≤ N, does not have an agent node in 
its neighbor list, it tries to find the nearest agent node by broadcasting a query 
including its key space IDs. If sij’s neighbors have an agent node in their neighbor 
lists, they forward the query to the agent node. If there are no agent nodes in two 
hops, neighbors of sij forward the query to their neighbors and this flooding of 
queries goes on until either a hop-limit is reached or an agent node is reached. If 
the secure link graph is connected, sij eventually finds an agent node. 
 
   
     sib   
 
sia 
Zone i 
Communication range 
 
  Agent node 
 
      Regular node 
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2. If more than one agent node is found at the same hop count, they all get the same 
query and reply by sending their key space IDs. Node sij picks one of the agent 
nodes, let the chosen agent node be sia, and sends back an acknowledgement 
message to sia. 
 
3. Since both sia and sij knows each other’s key space IDs, they can find out their 
shared key spaces and compute their pairwise key as explained in Section 3.3.  
  
It is possible that regular node sij does not share any key spaces with any of the agent 
nodes in its zone. In this case, a path key can be established between sij and its nearest agent 
node using the method explained in Section 3.5.1.  
 
3.5 Path Key Establishment Phase 
 
After direct key establishment phase, a sensor node, sij, may end up in a case where it 
cannot find any shared keys to establish secure links with one or more of its neighbors. If 
sij’s neighbor is from the same zone, sij initiates the intra-zone path key establishment 
process. Else, if sij’s neighbor is from a neighboring zone, sij initiates the inter-zone path 
key establishment process. 
 
3.5.1 Intra-Zone Path Key Establishment Process 
 
If node sij’s neighbor, sin, is from the same zone, sij tries to find a secure path to sin 
with the help of its secure neighbors. As long as secure link graph is a connected graph, sij 
can find a path to sin using only secure neighbors. The process of establishing a secure link 
over a secure path between same zone nodes is called inter-zone path key establishment. 
 
The process works as follows. Assume node sij does not have a secure link with its 
neighbor node sin. Node sij asks its 1-hop secure neighbors through broadcasting, to see if 
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they have secure links with node sin. If any of the neighbors, say sim, has such a secure link, 
then sim generates a random key and sends the key to both node sij and sin over secure links. 
Then, sim removes this random key from its memory and the nodes sij and sin use this key to 
establish a secure link. If none of the 1-hop secure neighbors has a secure link with node 
sin, then the query is forwarded to sij’s 2-hop secure neighbors. If not found again, sij asks 
next hop neighbors until it finds a node that have a secure link with sin. If the graph of 
secure links is a connected graph, a node eventually finds a secure path to any node in the 
sensor network.  
 
In the performance analysis section, we show that a node can reach most of its same 
zone neighbors in only one hop. For a regular node to reach its different zone neighbors, it 
should perform the following process.  
 
3.5.2 Inter-Zone Path Key Establishment Process 
 
When node sij’s neighbor, smn, is from a neighboring zone, sij needs an agent node to 
communicate securely with smn. Thus, every regular node needs a secure path to its nearest 
agent node before initiating inter-zone path key establishment process. In the performance 
analysis section, we show that when there are eight agent nodes in a zone, most of the 
regular nodes can reach their nearest agent node in only one hop. If a regular node cannot 
reach any of the agent nodes in one hop, it can find a secure path to its nearest agent node 
with the help of secure neighbors, as described in the hybrid key establishment method. 
Assuming both smn and sij have direct or hybrid links with an agent node, inter-zone path 
key establishment process works as follows: 
 
I. They exchange their and their nearest agent node’s ID, 
 
II. One of the regular nodes send IDs received from the other node to its nearest 
agent node over a secure link. They can decide which node will send according to 
some metric; it can be their energy level or which one has the smallest ID. Let smn 
send the message to its agent node. 
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III. If smn and sij are from neighboring zones, their agent nodes must share a pairwise 
key, as explained in the inter-zone key predistribution step. Agent nodes can 
easily find out their shared pairwise key, Kp, just by looking at each others ID. 
Node smn has either a direct or hybrid key, explained in Section 3.4, Ks, to its 
agent node. Node smn‘s agent node generates a random key, Kr, and encrypts it 
with Kp; EKp {Kr}. Then smn’s agent node sends the message EKs { Kr, EKp {Kr}} to 
smn over a secure path or secure link.  
 
IV. Node smn decrypts the message and retrieves Kr. Then smn sends EKp {Kr} to its 
neighbor, sij. 
 
V. Node sij sends the message, EKp {Kr}, to its nearest agent node. The agent node 
decrypts EKp {Kr} and sends Kr back to sij over a secure link or secure path.  
 
VI. Both smn and sij share Kr and can use the key to encrypt their communication.  
 
As an example, we provide the inter-zone path key establishment process between 
two nodes, sib and sjb. Nodes sib and sjb are from neighboring zones and they already 
established hybrid keys with their nearest agent nodes. The example is shown in Figure 3.5: 
 
1. Sensor node sjb initiates the inter-zone path key establishment process by sending 
message M1 = {sjb, sja} to node sib 
 
2. Sensor node sib receives M1 and sends back M2 = { sib, sia } to sjb  
 
3. Assume that agent node sia and regular node sib has already established a secure 
link and share a direct key, Kd. Sensor node sib sends M3 = EKd{{ sjb, sja }} to its 
agent node sia. 
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4. Agent node sia finds out its shared pairwise key, Kp, with sja by looking at sja’s ID. 
Then agent node sia generates a random key, Kr, to be used as sib and sjb’s shared 
secret key. After that, agent node sia sends encrypted message M4 = EKd{Kr, EKp 
{Kr}} to sib. 
 
5. Sensor node sib receives and decrypts M4 and retrieves Kr and EKp {Kr}. Then, sib 
sends M5 = EKp {Kr} to sjb. 
 
6. Sensor node sjb receives M5 but cannot decrypt it because sib and sjb does not yet 
share any key. In addition, sjb does not have a direct link with agent node sja; sjb 
can reach agent node sja in two hops with the help of sjc. Assume that sjb and sjc 
has already established secure link using direct key establishment method and 
share a direct key, Kd1. Sensor node sjb sends M6 = EKd1 { EKp {Kr}} to sjc. 
 
7. Sensor node sjc receives and decrypts M6, then retrieves EKp {Kr}. After that, sjc 
encrypts EKp {Kr} with Kd2, shared direct key with sjc and agent node sja. sjc sends 
M7 = EKd2 { EKp {Kr}} to sja. 
 
8. Agent node sja receives and decrypts M7, retrieves EKp {Kr}. Then using the 
shared pairwise key between two agent nodes, sja and sia, sja retrieves Kr. Assume 
that agent node sja and sjb shares a secret key, EKd3, generated using the hybrid key 
establishment method, explained in Section 3.4. Then, sja encrypts Kr with EKd3 
and gets EKd3 {Kr}. Agent node sja re-encrypts the message with EKd2 and sends 
M8 = EKd2 { EKd3 {Kr}} to sensor node sjc. 
 
9. Sensor node sjc receives and decrypts M8, then retrieves EKd3 {Kr}. After that, sjc 
encrypts EKd3 {Kr} with Kd1, shared direct key between sjc and sjb. Regular node 
sjc sends M9 = EKd1 { EKd3 {Kr} } to sjb. 
 
 48 
10. Lastly, sensor node sjb receives and decrypts M9, then retrieves EKd3 {Kr}. By 
decrypting EKd3 {Kr}, sjb retrieves Kr. Using Kr, sib and sjb can securely 
communicate with each other.  
 
 
Figure 3-5 Example case: Two neighboring regular nodes, sib and sjb, from different zones 
establish a secure link through inter-zone path key establishment process 
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4 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
 
 
In this section, a detailed performance evaluation of our key predistribution scheme is 
provided. In order to evaluate the performance of our scheme, various simulations are used, 
each examining one of the performance metrics. Also for comparison, we simulated some 
of the well-known key predistribution schemes [1], [8], and [9]. Note that, in order to make 
a fair comparison with our scheme and [8], we had to modify [8]. Our key predistribution 
scheme has a very basic difference with some other key predistribution schemes, e.g. [8], 
[11], [15]: regular nodes cannot directly find a common key with neighboring nodes from 
adjacent zones; they have to first contact their nearest zone agent. Thus, at the first stage of 
key establishment, direct key establishment phase, our regular nodes can only find common 
keys with the same zone nodes, whereas in other schemes [8],  [11], [15] nodes have 
mechanisms to directly establish keys with nodes from neighboring zones. In order to 
compare local connectivity results of our scheme with other schemes, we modified other 
schemes so that nodes from different zones cannot find shared keys.  
 
4.1 Performance Evaluation Metrics 
 
We are going to evaluate the performance of our scheme using the following 
metrics: 
 
• Connectivity: Both global and local connectivity issues are analyzed. Local 
connectivity can be referred as the probability of two neighboring nodes sharing at 
least one key space, i.e. having a direct secure link. Assuming that key spaces are 
homogenously distributed among sensor nodes, local connectivity can also be 
defined as the average number of secure neighbors of a node. Global connectivity 
is the ratio of the number of nodes in the largest connected part of secure link 
graph to the size of the network.  
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• Communication Cost: After deployment, a node may not be able to find common 
key spaces with its neighbors. In that case, two neighboring nodes in the same 
zone can find a secure path to each other over their neighbors with which they are 
securely connected. If two nodes from adjacent zones need to establish a secure 
connection, they must include their zones’ agent nodes into the key establishment 
process. We will analyze the communication overhead of our key predistribution 
scheme when two neighboring nodes cannot establish a direct secure link.   
 
• Resilience against Node Compromise: One of the main threats against our 
scheme is the node compromise and its consequences on the rest of network. In 
our analysis, we assume that when an adversary captures a node, it can 
compromise all the cryptographic material on that node. Moreover, when a key 
space is compromised, some additional secure links that use this key space are 
also compromised. We will analyze the probability of a secure link being 
compromised after some number of nodes is captured. 
 
• Resilience against Node Fabrication and Wormhole Attack: As described in 
[16], in a node fabrication attack, an attacker can fabricate nodes with new IDs 
using compromised cryptographic material and deploy these fabricated nodes into 
the sensor network. In a wormhole attack, an adversary tunnels messages received 
in one part of the network over a low latency link and replays them in a different 
part [48]. We explain how and to what degree, our scheme is resilient against node 
fabrication and wormhole attacks. 
 
• Scalability: Our scheme’s performance under different sensor network sizes is 
analyzed. We performed simulations for sensor networks with 100 zones and 1000 
zones.  
 
4.2 System Parameters 
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In our analysis and simulation, we use the following configuration. 
 
• Deployment area is 1000m x 1000m 
• Deployment area is divided into 10 x 10 zones, i.e. Z=100 
• Each zone is 100m x 100m square area.  
• Total number of sensor nodes is 10000 and there are 100 nodes in each zone, i.e. 
N=100.  
• Communication range, R, for each node is 40m.  
• Standard deviation of normal distribution, σ, is 50m and center of each zone is the 
deployment point of sensor nodes. 
 
4.3 Local Connectivity 
 
Local connectivity can be defined as the probability of two neighboring nodes sharing 
at least one key space (i.e. nodes can compute a pairwise key and establish a secure link) 
[9].  We denote this probability as Plocal.  
 
In Figure 4.1, local connectivity values of our scheme and Du et al.’s scheme [9] are 
shown. It can be observed that the ratio τ / ω is the determiner Plocal, ω is the total number 
of keys spaces for a zone and τ is the number of key spaces installed in a sensor node. As τ 
increases and ω decreases, the probability that two neighboring nodes share at least one key 
space increases. Thus, memory used for key spaces in a sensor node does not directly affect 
the Plocal values. Plocal is independent of the size of each matrix share, λ. As explained in 
Section 3.2.1, the memory used for key spaces is m)1)1(( ++λτ  bits.  
 
For comparison purposes, we simulated Du et al’s scheme [9], which is also based on 
Blom’s scheme [2]. Simulation results for local connectivity are shown in Figure 4.1. Du et 
al’s scheme does not divide the sensor deployment area into grids and does not divide 
sensors into groups. It is a probabilistic scheme where ω key spaces are created before 
deployment and τ key spaces are randomly picked for each sensor and installed in each 
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sensor node, where τ < ω. If two neighboring nodes share one or more key spaces, they can 
generate a common key as described in [2, 9] and can establish a secure link.  
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Figure 4-1 Local connectivity, Plocal, vs. τ, # of key spaces installed in a node 
 
Note that, in our simulations, we divide the deployment area into 100 zones, so when 
ω, number of key spaces available for a key space, is equal to x, total number of key spaces 
created for the whole network is 100x. Therefore, both schemes are simulated under similar 
conditions; total number of key spaces for the whole network is the same for both our 
scheme and Du et al.’s scheme.  
 
It can be observed from Figure 4.1 that local connectivity performance of our scheme 
is clearly higher than that of Du et al’s scheme [9]. For example, when ω is 6 and τ is 3, our 
scheme reaches a Plocal value of 0.5942. On the other hand, when ω is 600 and τ is 3 for Du 
et al.’s scheme, Plocal is 0.0149. Figure 4.1 shows that using deployment knowledge by 
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dividing the sensor network into zones substantially increases local connectivity 
performance while keeping the memory cost the same.  
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Figure 4-2 Local connectivity vs. memory usage for Du et al.’s scheme using deployment 
knowledge [8] and our scheme. For our scheme ω = 7 and τ = 2, 3, 4 
 
Figure 4.2 shows local connectivity versus memory usage values obtained from 
simulation results of our scheme and Du et al’s scheme using deployment knowledge [8], 
we will call this scheme “Du et al’s scheme 2”. In [8], Du et al. divide the sensor network 
into zones. Then, key pools of size Sc for each zone are created using a method described in 
[8] and randomly assign m of them to each sensor, where m is the number of keys in each 
sensor node. In Du et al’s scheme 2, a zone’s key pool is setup such that it contains keys 
from all neighboring zones. Their approach is a modified version of Eschenauer and 
Gligor’s scheme [1]. They improve the scheme in [1] by using deployment knowledge. A 
more detailed description of key predistribution scheme in [8] can be found in Chapter 2.  
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For the simulations of Du et al’s scheme 2, we used the following parameters; size of 
global key pool, |S|, is 100000 and the sensor network is divided into 100 zones and there 
are 100 nodes in each zone.  
In Figure 4.2, we simulated our scheme for various values of λ+1. For our scheme, τ, 
number of key spaces installed in a node, and λ+1, size of a matrix share, give the number 
of keys in a node. For example, when τ=3 and λ+1=25, number of keys is 75. When λ+1 is 
15 and τ is less than 4, our scheme has better local connectivity than Du et al.’s scheme 2. 
However, local connectivity of our scheme does not increase more than 0.6209 and Plocal 
for Du et al’s scheme 2 reaches 0.9522 when number of keys are 150. Local connectivity 
for our scheme stops increasing after a specific value because regular nodes cannot 
establish direct secure links with their different-zone neighbors; they can only setup shared 
keys with different-zone neighbors via inter-zone path key establishment process. Whereas, 
in Du et al’s scheme 2, nodes have the capability to share keys with nodes from 
neighboring zones. In our scheme, increasing λ+1 value does not change the local 
connectivity performance of our scheme. However, λ+1 value is one of the parameters that 
determines the resilience of our scheme, as we will show in the following section.  
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Figure 4-3 Local connectivity vs. memory usage for Eschenauer and Gligor’s scheme [1] 
and our scheme. For our scheme, ω = 7 and τ = 2, 3, 4 
 
In Figure 4.3, we show local connectivity performance of Eschenauer and Gligor’s 
scheme [1]. Eschenauer and Gligor’s scheme can be called as the basic probabilistic key 
predistribution scheme. Before deployment, a key pool of size Sc is setup and then m keys 
are randomly picked and installed into each node. In Eschenauer and Gligor’s scheme, 
deployment knowledge is not used, so whole deployment area can be seen as a single zone. 
After deployment, neighboring nodes check if they share any keys and establish secure 
links.  In our simulations for Eschenauer et al.’s scheme, we used a key pool of size 100000 
and there are 10 000 nodes in the sensor network. 
 
It can be seen in Figure 4.3 that our scheme clearly outperforms Eschenauer and 
Gligor’s scheme for all values of λ+1. Our scheme’s performance gain over Eschenauer 
and Gligor’s scheme is mostly because our scheme leverages deployment knowledge while 
distributing cryptographic material to sensor nodes.  
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4.4 Global Connectivity 
 
After node deployment, each node tries to establish secure links with their neighbors. 
As defined in Section 3.3, after direct key establishment phase, secure links form the secure 
link graph and the probability that secure link graph is connected gives the global 
connectivity as defined [1, 9]. We can compute global connectivity by finding the ratio of 
the largest connected block of nodes over the total number of nodes. The key 
predistribution scheme determines the connectedness of the key sharing graph and, 
therefore, the global connectivity. When sensor node distribution is uniform, i.e. a node can 
be anywhere in the deployment area regardless of its deployment point, we can estimate 
global connectivity using local connectivity and other sensor network parameters by using 
Erdös random graph theorem [19]. However, we use normal distribution to model our 
sensor node distribution, so Erdös random graph theorem is not applicable to our work. In 
our work, we only use simulations to estimate the global connectivity of sensor networks.  
 
Global connectivity indicates the amount of wasted nodes. If some nodes have no 
connection with the main block of sensor nodes, then they cannot contribute to the sensor 
network. Because nodes can find shared key spaces only with same zone neighbors without 
the help of agent nodes, nodes far away from their deployment points may have too few or 
no secure links. However, these isolated nodes can still have many physical links with 
different zone nodes.  
 
Figure 4.4 shows global connectivity of our scheme for τ=2, 3, 4 and ω=4, 5, 6. 
Simulation results indicate that even when τ = 2, more than 99% of nodes join and 
contribute to the sensor network. The rest can be seen as wasted sensor devices because 
they have no secure links with the largest body of sensor nodes. 
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Note that in Figure 4.4, nodes that have no other nodes in their communication range 
are not included in the computation of global connectivity since our key predistribution 
scheme has no effect on them.  
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Figure 4-4 Simulation results of our scheme for global connectivity vs. τ 
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Figure 4-5 Simulation results of global connectivity vs. τ for Du et al.’s scheme [9] 
 
Figure 4.5 illustrates global connectivity as a function of τ, number of key spaces 
installed in a node, for Du et al.’s scheme [9]. From the figure above, it can be observed 
that global connectivity has a threshold property. When τ is low, i.e. local connectivity is 
relatively low (see Figure 4.1), the secure link graph for Du et al.’s scheme is very 
shattered and global connectivity is very low. As the average number of secure links per 
node increases, global connectivity increases exponentially and quickly reaches high 
values.  
 
When we compare our scheme with Du et al’s scheme, global connectivity of our 
scheme is clearly higher, especially for low τ values. We simulated both our scheme and 
Du et al’s scheme under similar conditions. Note that, the sample network we used for 
simulations has 100 zones. Therefore, when ω is equal n, total number of key spaces in the 
whole sensor network is 100n. Total number of key spaces for both our scheme and Du et 
al’s scheme is comparable.  
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4.5 Communication Cost 
 
In this section, we investigate the communication overhead of our key predistribution 
scheme when two neighboring nodes cannot establish a direct secure link. After direct key 
establishment phase, average ratio of neighbors that could not be securely connected is 1 – 
Plocal. When a node shares at least one key space with one if its neighbors, they are 
obviously connected at one hop, i.e. they are one-hop neighbors. For the rest of its 
neighbors, a node has to make multi-hop communication in order to establish secure links. 
In our key predistribution scheme, a sensor network incurs most of communication cost 
during three operations: intra-zone path key establishment, hybrid key establishment and 
inter-zone path key establishment. During intra-zone path key and hybrid key 
establishment processes, each key is setup via flooding.  
 
4.5.1 Intra-Zone Path Key Establishment 
 
When two neighboring nodes from the same zone cannot find a common key space, 
they have to reach each other through a multi-hop communication. As we discussed in 
Section 3.5.1, these two nodes have to find a secure path between them. We used 
simulations to estimate the average number of hops required to connect these two nodes 
under various conditions. Figure 4.6 illustrates number of hops and connectivity of 
corresponding secure link graphs for various τ and ω combinations.  
 
It can be observed from Figure 4.6 that when τ / ω ratio is high, a node can reach all 
of its same-zone neighbors in only one hop, i.e. can establish direct links. For example, 
when τ is 3 and ω is 6, a node can reach, on average, 0.9503 of its same-zone neighbors in 
one hop, and the rest in two hops. Note that, while calculating communication overhead in 
our simulations, we ignored nodes that have no secure links, because in order to establish 
path keys, nodes must have some secure links beforehand.   
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Figure 4-6 Communication overhead for intra-zone path key establishment 
 
4.5.2 Hybrid key establishment 
 
In our scheme, it is crucial for regular nodes to share a hybrid key (see Section 3.4) 
with an agent node in order to perform inter-zone key establishment process. When a node 
wants to establish a secure link with a node from a different zone, it sends a message to its 
nearest agent node (nearest in terms of number of hops over a secure path) over a path of 
secure links and then the agent node sends back a message through the same path. A 
detailed description of this process can be found in Section 3.5.2, inter-zone path key 
establishment process. Therefore, the number of hops, a regular node can reach its nearest 
agent node, is an important indicator of network connectivity and an important parameter 
in overall communication cost. We show in Figure 4.8 that majority of regular nodes can 
reach their nearest agent nodes in two hops when the number of agent nodes in a zone is 
five, i.e. Az = 5. 
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Figure 4-7 Ratio nodes reaching their nearest zone agent in i hops when Az =2, i=1,…,4+ 
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Figure 4-8 Ratio nodes reaching their nearest zone agent in i hops when Az =5, i=1,…,3+ 
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Figure 4-9 Ratio nodes reaching their nearest zone agent in i hops when Az =8, i=1,…,3+ 
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Figure 4-10 Ratio nodes reaching their nearest zone agent in i hops when Az=10 
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From the figures above, it can be seen that even with limited number of agent nodes, 
any node can reach their nearest zone agent in at most 3 hops. Note that, in order to find a 
secure path to a zone agent, a regular node uses the flooding technique as explained in 
Section 3.4. This method can cause large number of messages. However, in our scheme, 
flooding technique is used only for establishing path keys with same-zone neighbors and 
while finding a secure path to nearest zone agent. While a regular node is establishing a 
hybrid key with a zone agent, flooding is required only for one time. A secure path to 
nearest zone agent is found only once. Then the same path can be used for all subsequent 
inter-zone path key establishment processes.  
 
During hybrid key establishment processes, agent nodes have to carry out more 
communication than regular nodes, because an agent node is usually responsible for 
multiple regular nodes. For example, when the number of agent nodes in a zone is 5, on 
average 19 nodes use one agent node. For each of these 19 nodes, an agent node performs 
the hybrid key establishment method. Assuming a message containing τ key space indices 
and node ID is 64 bits long and the cost of transmitting a bit over radio is 0.01µJ [54], we 
show cost of communication for one agent node during hybrid key establishment processes 
in Table 4.1. Note that an AA type NiMH battery can produce 11 kJ energy, on average. 
Thus, hybrid key establishment process does not incur significant amount of energy cost on 
an agent node carrying two AA type batteries.   
 
Table 4-1 Energy consumption of an agent node during hybrid key establishment 
Az Energy consumption (µJ) 
2 31,36 
5 12,16 
8 7,36 
10 5,76 
 
4.5.3 Inter-Zone Path Key Establishment 
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When two neighboring regular nodes are from different zones, they try to establish a 
secure link by inter-zone path key establishment process, as discussed in Section 3.5.2. In 
this process, regular nodes communicate with both their zone agents and each other. 
Regular nodes send encrypted messages to their agent nodes over a secure path or a direct 
link. Then, agent nodes send back messages over the same path.  
 
Assuming that one of the regular nodes is h1 hops away from its zone agent and hop 
length between the other node and its zone agent is h2, total number of messages exchanged 
during inter-zone path key establishment process can be found as: 
 
                                         ( ) 32 21 ++ hh                                                                (4.1) 
 
This process incurs most of the communication cost on the sensor network, because 
every neighboring node pair from different zones has to establish secure links using this 
process. Our simulations show that average number of different-zone neighbors of a node 
is 18.0226 and average number of physical neighbors is 48.8934. Table 4.2 shows number 
of inter-zone path keys, i.e. number of different-zone neighbor pairs, for different Az values, 
number of agent nodes in a zone. Values in Table 4.2 are obtained from simulations on the 
10000 nodes sensor network described in Section 4.2. Although there are seemingly many 
inter-zone path keys, each process usually involves more than two nodes. Regular nodes, 
near the center of zones, also contribute to inter-zone path key establishment process by 
acting as possible intermediaries between zone agents and owners of path keys. 
 
Table 4-2 Communication cost 
Az 2 5 8 10 
# of inter-zone path keys 88379 85599 82840 81118 
 
There is a cost of each inter-zone path key establishment process to the sensor 
network. Through simulations, we calculated the number of protocol messages exchanged 
for each inter-zone path key. Figures 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13 illustrate the ratio of inter-zone 
path keys established versus number of messages exchanged for various ω and τ values. 
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For example, when ω = 6, τ = 3 and Az = 5, 83 % of all inter-zone path keys are established 
by exchanging 9 or less protocol messages.  Maximum number of messages required in 
order to establish all inter-zone path keys is 13 when ω = 6, τ = 3 and Az = 10.  
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Figure 4-11 Communication cost for inter-zone path key establishment, ω = 6 and τ = 4 
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Figure 4-12 Communication cost for inter-zone path key establishment, ω = 6 and τ = 3 
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Figure 4-13 Communication cost for inter-zone path key establishment, ω = 6 and τ = 2 
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It can be observed from the figures above that increasing Az, number of agent nodes 
in a zone, decreases distance between regular nodes and their nearest agent nodes and 
consequently, decreases number of messages exchanged. The most dominant factor that 
affects communication cost for inter-zone path key establishment process is the hop 
distance between regular nodes and their nearest zone agents.  
 
Results from Figures 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13 comply with results from Figures 4.7, 4.8, 
4.9 and 4.10. Figures 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 show that for Az =5, 8, or 10, majority of nodes can 
reach their nearest agent node in only one hop. Based on Equation 4.1, we can expect that a 
quick rise in ratio of inter-zone path keys after number of messages reach 7 
since ( ) 73112 =++ . It can be seen from Figures 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13 that less than 10 
percent of inter-zone path keys are established with 5 messages; however, there is steep 
increase when number of messages reach 7, especially for high Az values. For example, the 
ratio of established inter-zone path keys reaches 0.7 for Az=10 when number of messages 
reach 7.  
 
Note that there is only a slight difference between Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12. 
Decreasing τ, results in lower local connectivity. However, it can be seen from Figures 4.7, 
4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 that decreasing τ from 4 to 3 does not change the average hop distance 
between regular nodes and their nearest agent nodes much. That is the reason behind why 
lowering local connectivity in Figures 4.11 and 4.12 does not affect the ratio of inter-zone 
path keys too much. 
 
During inter-zone path key establishment, an agent node may be intermediary for 
multiple regular nodes. During a inter-zone path key establishment process, an agent node 
transmits only one message. However, an agent node has to contribute to all inter-zone path 
key establishment processes of all its regular nodes. For example, when Az is 5, number of 
regular nodes in a zone is 95, so, on average, 19 regular nodes use an agent node. Our 
simulations show that each of these regular nodes has 17 different-zone neighbors. At each 
inter-zone path key establishment process, an agent node sends a message containing a 
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secret key and encrypted version of that key, and we assume that the transmitted message is 
160 bits long. The cost of transmitting a bit over radio is 0.01 µJ [54]. In Table 4.3, we 
show the energy consumed by an agent node while transmitting messages for inter-zone 
path key establishment processes. Note that an AA type NiMH battery can produce 11 kJ 
energy, on average. Thus, inter-zone path key establishment process does not incur 
significant amount of energy cost on an agent node carrying two AA type batteries.   
 
Table 4-3 Energy consumption of an agent node during inter-zone path key establishment 
of all its regular nodes 
Az Energy consumption (µJ) 
2 1385,8 
5 520,4 
8 304,8 
10 233,6 
 
4.5.4 Flooding 
 
 When flooding method is used during establishment of a pairwise key, a node 
broadcasts a query and each neighboring node forwards this query to all their next hop 
neighbors. Thus, during flooding, excessive number of messages are transmitted. 
Apparently, flooding incurs heavy communication cost on the sensor network. In our 
scheme, number of intra-zone path keys and hybrid keys determine the number of flooded 
messages. In Figure 4.14, Figure 4.15, Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, we show number of 
different types of keys established in our scheme and in Du et al’s scheme 2.  
 
In our scheme, only intra-zone path keys and hybrid keys are established via 
flooding. In Figure 4.14 and Table 4.4, sum of intra-zone path keys and hybrid keys are 
shown as “keys using flooding”. The values in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.14 are results from 
simulations performed using parameters described in Section 4.2. Communication cost of 
establishing other keys, direct keys and inter-zone path keys, are less than establishing keys 
using flooding. It can be seen that keys established via flooding cover only a small ratio of 
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all keys. As ω / τ ratio increases, less flooding is used. In Table 4.4, it can be observed that 
by increasing Az, we can decrease the number of hybrid keys established.     
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Figure 4-14 Number of keys established in our scheme. “Keys Using Flooding” shows 
total number of intra-zone path keys and hybrid keys. 
  
Table 4-4 Number of keys established in our scheme for various ω : τ : Az values 
ω:τ:Az Direct 
Keys 
Keys using flooding (Intra-zone path 
keys + hybrid keys) 
Inter-zone 
Path Keys 
Total 
Keys 
6:2:5 195596 116754 (114623+2131)  176368 488718 
6:3:5 293542 17511 (15344+2167) 177899 488952 
6:3:2 293542 20219 (15372+4847) 177899 491660 
6:4:5 308354 2527 (358+2169) 178045 488926 
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Figure 4-15 Number of keys established in Du et al’s scheme 2. Path keys use flooding. 
 
Table 4-5 Number of keys established in Du et al’s scheme 2 for various m values 
 Direct Keys Path Keys (use flooding) Total Keys 
60 325320 163549 488869 
50 274138 214729 488867 
40 211530 277389 488919 
30 139366 349410 488776 
 
In Du et al’s scheme 2, path keys are established via flooding. In Figure 4.15 and 
Table 4.5, we present simulation results for a sensor network with 10000 nodes using Du et 
al’s scheme 2. As m, number of keys stored in a node, increases, number of direct keys 
increases and, thus, less flooding is required. It can be observed from Figure 4.15 and Table 
4.5 that, when m is less than 50, majority of the pairwise keys are path keys. Thus, majority 
of the keys are established using flooding. 
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Figure 4-16 Number of keys established using flooding in our scheme and Du et al’s 
scheme 2 
 
In Figure 4.16, we compare use of flooding in our scheme versus Du et al’s scheme 
2. In our scheme, number of keys, m, is calculated as ( )1m λ τ= + . In Figure 4.16, we took 
λ+1 as 17, which is the value used in node capture resiliency simulations, and showed the 
change of number of keys using flooding with respect to τ values 2, 3 and 4 (that 
corresponds to m values 34, 51, and 68).  
 
From Figure 4.16, it can be seen that for all m values, our scheme uses less flooding 
than Du et al’s scheme 2. Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 show that total number of keys in both 
schemes are approximately equal. Thus, the ratio of keys established via flooding in our 
scheme is less than that of Du et al’s scheme 2. The rest of the keys are either direct keys or 
inter-zone path keys in our scheme and the rest of the keys are direct keys in Du et al’s 
scheme 2. Establishment of inter-zone path keys causes more communication cost than 
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direct keys. However, they do not use flooding, so they are cheaper than path keys in Du et 
al’s scheme 2.  
 
As a result, although our scheme has inter-zone path keys, which has additional 
communication cost as compared to direct keys, our scheme uses less flooding than Du et 
al’s scheme 2.   
 
4.6 Resiliency Against Node Capture 
 
The most obvious attack against a sensor network is capturing sensor nodes. 
Therefore, we will investigate the effects of node capture attack on direct key 
establishment, as done in other key predistribution schemes, such as [7], [8], [9], [16] and 
[20]. We will assume when a node is captured, all of its cryptographic material is 
compromised. Using those compromised material, attacker can also compromise some 
additional links. A key distribution scheme’s resiliency against node capture can be defined 
as the ratio of additional compromised links over total number of links except those of 
captured nodes. Since, there is no way to prevent an attacker from capturing nodes and 
gaining access to their cryptographic material, we do not include secure links of captured 
nodes into our resiliency calculations.   
 
In our scheme, at the intra-zone key predistribution phase, we store matrix shares into 
each sensor node. For a key space to be compromised, λ+1 nodes carrying shares from that 
key space must be compromised as in [2, 9]. An attacker with λ shares from the same 
matrix cannot gain any extra information about that key space and cannot learn private 
shares of nodes that are not captured.  
 
When an attacker captures an agent node, attacker can compromise both its matrix 
shares and its pairwise keys, shared with other agent nodes. When an agent node is 
captured, attacker can gain information about only that node’s secure links, because there 
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are only two copies of a pairwise key, and a pairwise key can be used only in one secure 
link. In other words, pairwise keys have perfect resiliency against node capture.  
 
While analyzing the node capture resiliency of a key predistribution scheme, it is 
commonly assumed that attacker does not record encrypted messages, [7, 8, 9, 16, 20]. 
Considering that sensors are deployed on a very wide area, it is impractical for an attacker 
to eavesdrop all communication and record them. A sensor node may contribute to some 
hybrid key or path key establishment processes. Because of this assumption, when attacker 
captures that node, attacker cannot learn any of hybrid or path keys by using that node’s 
keys.  
 
In Figure 4.17, we show node capture resiliency of our scheme, Du et al’s scheme 2 
[8] and Du et al’s scheme [9]. While computing resiliency performances, we simulate key 
predistribution schemes with the similar Plocal and memory usage values. For our scheme, 
ω=7, τ=3, λ+1=17 and Plocal =0.5605. For Du et al’s scheme 2, m=50, Sc=1000 and 
Plocal=0.5569. For Du et al’s scheme, ω=43, τ=4, λ+1=13 and Plocal =0.56.  
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Figure 4-17 Ratio of additionally compromised links when # of nodes are captured for our 
scheme, Du et al’s scheme 2 [8] and Du et al’s scheme [9]. Plocal =0.56.  
 
In Figure 4.18, we show node capture resiliency of our scheme, Du et al’s scheme 2 
[8] and Du et al’s scheme [9]. For our scheme, ω=7, τ=2, λ+1=17 and Plocal =0.3444. For 
Du et al’s scheme 2, m=34, |S|=100000 and Plocal=0.3412. For Du et al’s scheme, ω=11, 
τ=2, λ+1=17 and Plocal =0.3445.  
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Figure 4-18 Ratio of additionally compromised links when # of nodes are captured for our 
scheme, Du et al’s scheme 2 [8] and Du et al’s scheme [9]. Plocal =0.34. 
 
It can be observed from Figure 4.17 and Figure 4.18 that both Du et al’s scheme 2 
and our scheme have substantially better resiliency than Du et al’s scheme [9]. The most 
important reason for such a difference is that scheme in [9] does not utilize deployment 
knowledge and treats the whole sensor network as a single zone and thus, has to lower ω  
in order to achieve high local connectivity. When ω is low, same key spaces have to be 
repeated frequently in a 10000-node sensor network. When Plocal is 0.34, attacker can 
compromise two matrix shares for each captured node and this lead to quick compromise 
of the whole network; by capturing only 500 nodes, an attacker can compromise all 11 key 
spaces. Whereas, Du et al’s scheme 2 and our scheme use deployment knowledge and 
deployment area is divided into 100 zones. In our scheme, when ω is 6, there are 600 
different key spaces in the whole sensor network.  
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When ratios of additionally compromised links are compared between Figure 4.17 
and Figure 4.18, it can be seen that decreasing local connectivity, improves node capture 
resiliency for all three analyzed schemes. For our scheme, we reduce the keying 
information revealed at each captured node by decreasing τ from 3 to 2. 
 
Our scheme has better resiliency than Du et al’s scheme 2 in general. Especially, 
when number of captured nodes is less than 2000 and Plocal is 0.56, our scheme causes zero 
or negligible number of additionally compromised links. In order to decrease Plocal to 0.34 
for our scheme, we dropped τ to 2 and kept λ+1=17. This way, even when 3000 nodes are 
captured, negligible amount of additional links are compromised. However, when Plocal= 
0.56, in Du et al’s scheme 2, an adversary can compromise 62 percent of secure links by 
capturing only 2000 nodes. Our scheme has stronger resiliency against small-scale attacks. 
The reason is that our scheme is based on Blom’s scheme and in Blom’s scheme an 
attacker can gain no information on a key space with less than λ+1 shares. Therefore, 
attacker must capture a substantial number of nodes before compromising any additional 
links. However, with Du et al’s scheme 2, when an attacker captures only one node, he can 
start to compromise additional secure links where copies of captured node’s keys are used.  
 
It can be observed from Figure 4.17 that after an adversary starts to capture more than 
2500 nodes, number of compromised links rises quickly for our scheme. Only after 5500 
captured nodes, our scheme catches up with Du et al scheme 2 in terms of compromised 
links. Our scheme has slightly better node capture resiliency even when number of 
captured nodes is high.    
 
4.7 Resiliency Against Node Fabrication and Wormhole Attacks 
 
In a node fabrication attack, an adversary can capture a few nodes and use the 
compromised cryptographic material to fabricate new sensor nodes with identities of 
uncompromised sensor nodes or to fabricate sensor nodes with new identities [16]. Then, 
the adversary can deploy these fabricated nodes with new identities into any part of the 
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sensor network or deploy fabricated nodes with identities of uncompromised nodes into the 
parts of the network where original nodes are not present.  
 
Node fabrication attack is a serious threat to key predistribution schemes like [1] and 
[8] because there is no connection between ID of sensors and their keys. In schemes [1] or 
[8], uncompromised nodes cannot detect fabricated nodes since fabricated nodes carry 
legitimate keys captured from other nodes. For example, assume that in Eschenauer and 
Gligor’s scheme [1] each node carries m keys. If an attacker captures only two nodes, he 
can easily fabricate 






m
m2  new nodes and put these new nodes into the sensor network 
without being detected.  
 
In our scheme, each sensor node’s ID is linked with its matrix share, as explained in 
Section 2.6.3. When two nodes that share a key space want to generate a pairwise key, they 
only need each others’ ID; IDs are used to identify the row of secret matrix A and the 
column of public matrix G. Consequently, an adversary cannot use matrix shares of 
captured nodes to fabricate nodes with new IDs.  
 
In addition, our scheme provides a partial resiliency against wormhole attacks. In a 
wormhole attack, an adversary tunnels messages received in one part of the network over a 
low latency link and replays them in a different part. Wormhole attack is more effective if 
one end of the wormhole is near the sink and the other end is as far as possible. For more 
detailed information on wormhole attacks, see Section 2.5.7. 
 
In our scheme, we use a zone-based approach, as explained in Section 3.1. Nodes can 
establish secure links only with other nodes from the same zone or neighboring zones. A 
pair of nodes cannot establish a secure link, if they are two or more zones away from each 
other. Therefore, an adversary can successfully create a wormhole only if both ends of the 
wormhole are in the same zone or in neighboring zones. If the wormhole extends for three 
or more zones, nodes at different ends of the wormhole cannot communicate with each 
other and as a result, the wormhole will not be functional.  Thus, in our scheme, only short 
wormholes can be created but they can do only limited harm to the sensor network. In our 
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scheme, creation of longer wormholes, which can have severe affects on the sensor 
network, is prevented. 
 
4.8 Scalability 
 
 Scalability is an important performance factor. In a scalable key predistribution 
scheme, size of the sensor network could be increased without incurring any significant 
additional overhead and without changing any critical performance measures. In this 
analysis, we increase the number of zones in our simulated sensor network from 100 to 
1000 and we keep N, size of each zone, fixed. In this way, total number of nodes in the 
sensor network increase from 10000 to 100000. 
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Figure 4-19 Local connectivity for our scheme when Z =100 and Z =1000 
 
We performed simulations of our scheme with the deployment region divided into a 
40 × 25 grid and the rest of the parameters are the same as the parameters given in Section 
 79 
4.2. Local connectivity and global connectivity of our scheme when Z, number of zones, is 
equal to 1000 and 100 are plotted in Figure 4.19 and in Figure 4.20, respectively. Results 
show that connectivity of our scheme does not change significantly when the sensor 
network grows. When the number of zones is increased ten times, the ratio of secure 
neighbors a node can reach stays almost the same. Thus, adding new zones to the sensor 
network does not increase the memory cost on the sensor nodes.  
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Figure 4-20 Global connectivity of our scheme when Z=100 and Z=1000. 
 
In Figure 4.21, we show the communication cost of intra-zone path key establishment 
for ω:τ equal to 6:4, 6:3 and 6:2. We analyze the communication cost of intra-zone path 
key establishment by computing the ratio of same-zone neighbors a node can reach after i 
hops, i=1, 2, 3. The first three bars show the communication cost when Z=1000 and the last 
three show the communication cost when Z=100. It can be observed that enlarging the 
sensor network by adding new zones does not significantly increase the communication 
cost of intra-zone path key establishment.  
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Figure 4-21 Ratio of same-zone neighbors reached when Z=1000 and Z=100 
 
In Figure 4.22, we show the resiliency of our scheme against node capture for 
different sensor network sizes when Plocal = 0.56. The ratio of compromised links are 
almost the same for Z=100 and Z=1000 when the ratio of captured nodes are the same. 
Thus, increasing the size of the sensor network does not degrade the node capture 
resiliency of our scheme.    
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Figure 4-22 Ratio of additionally compromised links for our scheme when Z=100 and 
Z=1000  
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
In this thesis, we presented a two-tier random key predistribution scheme for sensor 
networks. In our scheme, we used a zone-based approach, in which each zone has its own 
separate key spaces. Secure links between zones are established through agent nodes, 
which are higher capacity nodes. We utilized Blom’s scheme [2] for key establishment 
between nodes from the same zones. 
 
Our scheme achieves high local and global connectivity values while consuming 
minimal memory. When ω, number of key spaces in a zone, is 7 and τ, number of key 
spaces stored in a node, is 3, local connectivity for our scheme is 0.5605. Our scheme 
provides substantially better connectivity than key predistribution schemes that do not use 
deployment knowledge, such as Du et al’s scheme [9] and Eschenauer and Gligor’s scheme 
[1]. Under similar conditions, Du et al’s scheme 2 [8], which utilizes deployment 
knowledge, performs Plocal = 0.5335. In addition, our scheme has high global connectivity. 
For example, when ω is 6 and τ is 2, more than 99% of the sensor network is connected.  
 
The communication cost of our scheme is within practical limits. At the intra-zone 
path key establishment phase, when ω is 6 and τ is 3, more than 90% of the nodes can 
establish secure links with their same-zone neighbors in only one hop and the rest can reach 
their same-zone neighbors in two hops. When ω is 4 and τ is 3, all the nodes can reach their 
same-zone neighbors in only one hop. Some communication cost is incurred while 
establishing hybrid keys with agent nodes. When number of agent nodes in a zone is 5, ω is 
6 and τ is 4, 78 % of the nodes can reach their nearest agent node in one hop and 97 % of 
the nodes can reach their nearest agent node in at most two hops. While establishing inter-
zone path keys, agent nodes and, occasionally, some intermediate nodes are required. 
When number of agent nodes in a zone is 10, 70 % of the inter-zone path key establishment 
processes causes only 7 messages and almost all inter-zone path keys can be established by 
exchanging at most 11 messages.  
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Our scheme achieves substantially strong node capture resiliency. In Du et al’s 
scheme 2 [8], which is one of the major key predistribution schemes, an adversary can 
compromise 62 % of links by capturing 2000 nodes. Whereas, in our scheme, ratio of 
additionally compromised links when 2000 nodes are captured is almost zero. In addition, 
our scheme shows node-to-node authentication property. In this way, it becomes resilient 
against node fabrication attack. Besides, our key predistribution scheme is easily scalable 
due to the employed zone-based approach. Finally, since we create distinct key spaces for 
different zones, our scheme has partial resistance against wormhole attacks.  
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